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LIMITS ON PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
When then-Congressman Gerald Ford made his now-famous remark
that an impeachable offense "is whatever a majority of the House of
Representatives considers [it] to be at a given moment in history,"' as a
political realist he spoke no more than the plain truth. The Constitution
confers on the House of Representatives the sole power to impeach a
president (and other "civil Officers of the United States"), and grants the
Senate the sole power to remove a President upon a finding by two-thirds
of its members that the president has committed 'Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors."2  The decisions to impeach and to
convict and remove from office are almost certainly not reviewable by any
court. 3  Therefore, a Congress disposed to do so can indeed displace a
president for any reason that will garner sufficient votes, and can act
without fear that its decision will be overridden by any other governmental
body.
Nonetheless, to acknowledge that Congress has the final word on what
constitutes a proper ground for impeaching a president is not to concede
that Congress is unconstrained by the Constitution when it makes its choice
for or against impeachment. The language of the Constitution limits the
instrument of impeachment to a very particular class of cases--"Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors"4-_and that language is
no more rendered meaningless by the congressional monopoly on its
interpretation than is the remainder of the Constitution by the fact that the
Supreme Court customarily has the last word on its meaning. Both the
Court and the Congress have an obligation of fidelity to the fundamental
design of the Republic embodied in the written Constitution.5 This Article
1. 116 CONG. REC. H3113-14 (1970) (statement of Rep. Gerald Ford). The comment was made
in the course of debate over whether to initiate impeachment proceedings against Supreme Court Justice
William 0. Douglas.
2. Id. (statement of Rep. Gerald Ford). The comment was made in the course of debate over
whether to initiate impeachment proceedings against Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas.
3. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993); Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 293
(1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 668 (1937) (rejecting as non-justiciable the claim of Judge Halstead
Ritter that the Senate convicted and removed him for non-impeachable offenses). See generally, e.g.,
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS 143-46 (1996).
4. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
5. Although the Supreme Court has come to be considered the primary guardian of
constitutional principles, Congress has an independent obligation to interpret faithfully and carry out the
dictates of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.3 ("The Senators and Representatives before
mentioned, and the Members of the Several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers,
both of the United States and the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this
Constitution"); INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 975 (1983) (Congress has an independent duty to uphold
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addresses the difficult problem of determining what qualifies as an offense
for which a President of the United States may constitutionally be
impeached and removed from office. It also considers the even more
nettlesome questions of whether there are impeachable offenses for which
Congress could, but need not, constitutionally remove a President, and if
such offenses exist, how Congress should exercise its discretion either to
impeach or to hold its hand. This Article had its genesis in a statement by
the authors submitted to the House Judiciary Committee during its
proceedings regarding the impeachment of President Clinton. This final
much expanded version appears after the conclusion of the Clinton
impeachment proceedings in the Senate, and it is certainly informed by the
course those proceedings took. Strictly speaking, however, this is not an
article "about" the Clinton impeachment. Although this Article draws
some conclusions from the treatment by the House and Senate of the
fundamental allegations against President Clinton, it does not address in
detail the specific facts underlying those allegations. The words "Monica
Lewinsky" appear for the first and last time in this sentence. Likewise, this
Article offers no opinion about whether President Clinton should or should
not have been impeached or removed. Instead, it approaches the issue of
defining impeachable offenses more generally, reviewing history
(including the very recent history of the Clinton proceedings), text, and
scholarship to discern the meaning of the constitutional phrase 'freason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." In doing so, this Article
deals principally with five interpretive questions that recurred throughout
the Clinton impeachment process, and that will certainly re-emerge in any
future presidential impeachment controversy:
1) Must an Impeachable Offense Be a Crime?
2) If Non-criminal Conduct Is Impeachable, What Distinguishes
Impeachable From Non-impeachable Non-criminal Conduct?
3) Is All Criminal Conduct a Proper Ground for Impeachment?
4) If Not All Crimes Are Impeachable Offenses, What Distinguishes
Impeachable Crimes From Non-impeachable Crimes?
5) Finally, Is There a Category of Impeachable Offenses for Which
the Congress Should Nonetheless Not Impeach?
the Constitution; members of Congress "are bound by oath to uphold the Constitution"); Paul Brest,
Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV.
57 (1986); Neal Devins & Michael A. Fitts, The Triumph of Timing: Raines v. Byrd and the Modem
Supreme Court's Attempt to Control Constitutional Confrontations, 86 GEO. U. 351 (1997).
1520 [Vol. 72:1517
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II. SOURCES OF AUTHORITY
In mapping the limits of the rather inscrutable constitutional phrase
"treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors," this Article
conforms to the historical practice of relying on the same sources one
would consult in construing other constitutional provisions: (1) the
language of the Constitution itself; (2) the intentions of the founding
generation as revealed in the debates of the convention and thereafter in the
debates on ratification; (3) the body of precedent created by prior American
impeachment proceedings; (4) the views of scholars and other
commentators; and (5) considerations of reason, common sense, and sound
public policy. The third of the these categories-precedent-merits brief
additional comment because the concept of "precedent" in impeachments
differs in important respects from the more familiar judicial usage.
First, there is very little impeachment precedent because there have
been very few impeachments. Until the impeachment of President Clinton,
in the nation's entire history the House of Representatives had impeached
only fifteen federal officials. Of these fifteen, twelve were judges, one was
a Senator, one a Secretary of War, and one was President Andrew Johnson.
A handful of other federal officers, including President Richard Nixon,
resigned or retired under threat of imminent impeachment. Consequently,
there are few cases involving the impeachment of executive branch
officials and, as discussed below, the standard for impeaching judges is
arguably quite different than the standard that should be applied when
removing a President.
Second, the "decisions" in impeachment cases are merely statements
of result. The officeholder was either impeached or not impeached for this
reason, or convicted or acquitted for another reason. Although individual
representatives, senators, or the prevailing or dissenting faction of a
committee, have occasionally stated their reasons for voting as they did,
such statements represent only the views of the Members who subscribed
to them, not the collective opinion of the legislature as a whole. Most
importantly, an explanation of result from a congressional source is not the
equivalent of a judicial opinion, because there is no legislative equivalent
of the doctrine of stare decisis binding future congresses to abide by either
the choices or the rationales of their predecessors. 6
6. See GERHARDT, supra note 3, at 47-53 (discussing the difficulty of using prior impeachments
as precedent).
1999] 1521
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It is true that some impeachments have been treated as "deciding"
certain questions. For example, in 1789, Senator William Blount was
expelled by the Senate and then impeached by the House. The Senate then
dismissed the impeachment proceedings for lack of jurisdiction.7  The
dismissal has been said to stand for the proposition that impeachment may
not be used against legislators. Similarly, in 1876, Secretary of War
William W. Belknap was impeached for bribery. He resigned and was later
acquitted in the Senate.8  The acquittal is said to establish that
impeachment may not be used against persons no longer in office. In truth,
neither of these propositions is beyond question, and either could probably
be ignored with impunity by a determined Congress.
9
The biggest problem may be knowing what use to make even of those
impeachment precedents where both the result and the contemporary
reasons for reaching it are fairly clear. The best example of this difficulty
is the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson. Although President
Johnson was acquitted in the Senate, the fact remains that the House
approved eleven articles of impeachment. Does the House vote, standing
alone, constitute precedent upon which succeeding Congresses may rely to
the effect that offenses of the type charged against President Johnson are
properly impeachable? Does the Senate's vote represent a judgment that
none of the eleven articles charged was an impeachable offense, or a
judgment that the offenses charged were not proven? Or is it fair to
conclude that the Senate vote meant either of those things in light of the
fact that Johnson was acquitted by only one vote, which means that a clear
majority of the senators cast votes for impeachment on Articles 2, 3, and
11, thus rendering an opinion that those charges were both impeachable
and proven? The Johnson case raises in particularly acute form the
question of whether we should give greater weight to the judgment of
Congress or the judgment of history. How should one think about what
Congress actually did in 1868 in light of the nearly universal conclusion of
later commentators that the Johnson impeachment effort was a misuse of
the impeachment power?
In the end, we believe that prior impeachment actions by Congress are
best viewed as a form of "persuasive authority." That is, members of
Congress are not bound by the actions of their congressional predecessors,
but should view prior impeachment proceedings as a valuable source of
7. See infra text accompanying note 175.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 205-09.
9. See, e.g., RAOuL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT 214-23 (1973) (suggesting that legislators are
amenable to impeachment despite the contrary precedent).
1522 [Vol.72:1517
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information about the proper and improper exercise of the impeachment
power. It is for this reason that we have attached an Appendix to this
Article detailing the grounds for and result of each of the prior
impeachments.
III. FIVE INTERPRETIVE PROBLEMS CONSIDERED
A. IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES ARE NOT LIMITED TO CRIMES
Some commentators and advocates have asserted that impeachment
may be based only on conduct that constitutes a crime. Notably,
congressional opponents of impeachment in the cases of Andrew Johnson
and Richard Nixon hewed to this line.'0 However, the weight of authority
is to the contrary.'1 In the first place, the Framers almost certainly intended
that presidents be impeachable for conduct not technically criminal.
During the Constitutional Convention debates in July 1787, the delegates
twice voted in favor of the general proposition that the president should be
removable for "malpractice or neglect of duty."12 Many delegates spoke of
10. See, e.g., Minority Views of Messrs. Hutchinson, Smith, Sandman, Wiggins, Dennis, Mayne,
Lott, Moorhead, Maraziti and Latta, in IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. REP.
No. 93-1035, at 359 (1974) ("The language of the Constitution indicates that impeachment can lie only
for serious criminal offenses."). Twenty-five years later, then-Congressman Wiggins, now a Senior
Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, testified before the House Judiciary
Committee during the Clinton impeachment proceedings and reiterated the view that "the misconduct
alleged to the officer subject to impeachment should be a crime." The Consequences of Perjury and
Related Crimes: Hearing Before the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 65 (1998) (statement
of Hon. Charles E. Wiggins). See also Statement of Senator Johnson, in 3 TRIAL OF ANDREW
JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, BEFORE THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ON
IMPEACHMENT BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 51 (1868)
[hereinafter TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON] (explaining his vote against impeachment in part on the
ground that, "the terms crimes and misdemeanors in the [Constitution] mean legal crimes and
misdemeanors").
11. For example, Justice Story wrote: "Congress have unhesitatingly adopted the conclusion, that
no previous statute is necessary to authorize an impeachment for any official misconduct. ... In the few
cases of impeachment, which have hitherto been tried, no one of the charges has rested upon any
statutable misdemeanours." JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrTTlON OF THE UNITED
STATES § 797 (1833). See also GERHARDT, supra note 3, at 103; BERGER, supra note 9, at 56-57;
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 33-35 (1974); Statement of Professor Gary L.
McDowell, infra note 22, at 37 ("Thus while an indictable crime may be deemed an impeachable
offense, impeachable offences are not simply limited to indictable crimes."); Constitutional Grounds
for Presidential Impeachment: Report by the Staff of the Impeachment Inquiry, House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong. 22-25 (1974) [hereinafter Constitutional Grounds]; Background and History of
Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
105th Cong. 89 (1998) [hereinafter Impeachment Background] (statement of Cass R. Sunstein).
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a body of offenses outside the common law crimes for which presidents
and other federal officials could be impeached, using terms such as
"maladministration, .... corrupt administration," "neglect of duty," and
"misconduct in office." 13  On August 20, 1787, the Committee on Detail
reported to the Convention that federal officers "shall be liable to
impeachment and removal from office for neglect of duty, malversation, 14
or corruption."' 5
Despite the tenor of these earlier discussions in the Convention, in its
report of September 4, 1787, the Committee of Eleven proposed that the
President be removable only on conviction of "treason or bribery."'16 On
September 8, George Mason made a motion the effect of which was to
restore the thrust of the general proposals previously assented to by adding
"maladministration" as a third ground for impeachment.' 7 Madison
objected to removal of a President "for any act which might be called a
misdemesnor [sic],' 8 observing that, "[s]o vague a term will be equivalent
to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate." 19  Mason withdrew
"maladministration," substituting "other high crimes and misdemeanors
against the State."20 The phrase "against the State" was later amended to
"against the United States," 21 and then deleted altogether by the Committee
on Style in the final draft of the Constitution.22
12. The first vote came on July 19, 1787, and the second on July 26, 1787. MAX FARRAND, 2
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 61, 69, 116 [hereinafter RECORDS].
13. Id. at 64-69. See also GERHARDT, supra note 3, at 7-9.
14. "Malversation" means "corrupt conduct or fraudulent practices, as in public office."
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 819 (3d ed. 1997).
15. RECORDS, supra note 12, at 337.
16. Id. at 495.




21. Id. at 551.
22. During the hearings before the House Judiciary Committee on the Clinton impeachment,
some scholars argued that the deletion of the phrase "against the United States" was tremendously
significant and signaled an intention to include within the category of"high Crimes and Misdemeanors"
a wide variety of purely private offenses with no relation to the presidential office. See, e.g.,
Background and History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
House Commn. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 89 (1998) (statement of Gary L. McDowell). Other
scholars contended that the deletion was genuinely one of style, signifying nothing more than a
conclusion by the drafters that "high Crimes and Misdemeanors against the United States" was a
redundancy. See, e.g., id at 85 (statement of Professor Cass R. Sunstein); Impeachment Inquiry:
Hearing Pursuant to H.. 581 Before the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 21 (1998)
[hereinafter Impeachment Inquiry] (statement of Professor Sean Wilentz). We concur in the latter view.
1524 [Vol. 72:1517
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It is plain that Mason's substitution of "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors" in the face of objections by Madison and others to
"maladministration" represented an effort to limit the reach of the original
proposal. 3 And although neither Mason nor anyone else at the Convention
offered any particular views on what the phrase "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors" meant, evidence suggests that the words were intended to
embrace at least some non-criminal conduct. Raoul Berger argued that the
phrase was a "technical term" derived from English practice, with which
the Framers would have been familiar and, therefore, that its technical
meaning "furnishes the boundary of the [impeachment] power."24 Among
the various kinds of official misconduct that fell within the English usage
of "high misdemeanors" were such non-criminal behavior as abuse of
power, neglect of duty, encroachment on the prerogatives of Parliament,
and betrayal of trust.25 Both Berger's factual premise that all, or at least
very many, of the Framers were intimately familiar with the details of
English impeachment precedents, and his conclusion that the Framers were
thus conscious of having adopted the particulars of those precedents by
reference through Mason's amendment seem to us somewhat doubtful.
Both premise and conclusion become still more doubtful when applied to
the sixteen hundred ratifiers who debated and approved the Constitution in
the state conventions.26 However, Berger is certainly correct that many
delegates to the Philadelphia and ratification conventions would have been
sufficiently familiar with English constitutional history to recognize "high
Crimes and Misdemeanors" as a phrase that embraced territory broader
than indictable crime, but more restricted than mere poor performance in
office.27
23. See BERGER, supra note 9, at 86.
24. Id. at 71, 86-87. See also PETER CHARLES HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT iN
AMERICA, 1635-1805, at 266-70 (1984) (arguing that the American understanding of impeachable
offenses essentially incorporates the English understanding); Statement of Professor Gary L.
McDowell, supra note 22, at 34-43.
25. See BERGER, supra note 9, at 70-71.
26. In the thirteen state conventions, a total of 1,071 delegates voted for the Constitution and 577
against it. See 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTTUTION 29-31
(Merrill Jensen, ed. 1978).
27. Berger's thesis is rendered somewhat more plausible by the recollection that many of the
active political figures of the revolutionary generation were also energetic practical political
philosophers for whom English history provided the principle source of precedent and comparison. For
example, in 1773-74, John Adams was casting about for a means of resisting parliamentary legislation
that undermined the independence of Massachusetts judges by securing them a salary from the Crown
rather than, as the Massachusetts charter required, from the colonial assembly. Adams made a special
study of English impeachments before proposing that the assembly impeach the judges for violating the
charter. Acting on Adams' suggestion and relying on English precedents, the Massachusetts House of
19991 1525
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The conclusion that criminality is not a prerequisite for impeachment
makes intuitive sense. It is hard to imagine that the Framers wished to
tolerate-or that Congress and the country must suffer-a President who
willfully refuses to perform, or is incapable of performing, the duties of the
Presidency. To take some extreme examples, a President would certainly
be subject to impeachment for refusing to organize the defense of the
country against foreign invasion, or refusing to cooperate with military
officers charged with command and control of the nuclear arsenal, or firing
all cabinet officers and refusing to name replacements. Likewise, it is
inconceivable that Congress could not remove a President who drank
himself into insensibility by lunchtime on a daily basis.28 While it may be
difficult to draw a hard and fast line between impeachable dereliction of
duty and the rejected standard of "maladministration," common sense
demands that the country have some means of self-protection against a
Chief Executive who abandons the constitutional responsibilities of the
office but does not happen to violate any criminal statutes.
Indeed, the historical record reveals a consistent pattern of
impeachment for non-criminal conduct.29 For example, Justice Samuel
Chase was impeached (though not convicted) for exhibitions of judicial
bias and making improper rulings.3" Judge George English was impeached
for habitual malperformance.31 The House impeached Judge Halstead
Representatives approved articles of impeachment against the judges, although the Council refused to
act upon them. See PAGE SMrrH, JOHN ADAMS 150-52 (1962). Still, it seems unlikely that the
particulars of Adams' pre-Revolutionary legal research lingered in the memory of any member of the
Constitutional Convention fourteen years later, and Adams himself was abroad as Ambassador to
England while the Constitution was being drafted and ratified. Id. at 725. On the other hand, the fact
that Massachusetts had impeached judges for non-criminal violations of its charter would certainly have
been well-remembered.
28. Of course, presidential incapacity due to drunkenness or other substance abuse might be dealt
with through the provisions of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, rather than the impeachment process.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
29. It is worth noting that non-criminal considerations may have been very important in the
impeachment and trial of at least two of those accused of criminal conduct. The impeachment of Judge
West Humphreys for his role in the southern rebellion and Confederacy and the impeachment of Judge
Walter Nixon following his conviction and imprisonment for peijury both involved judges who were
not holding court. Humphreys was in fact serving as a Confederate judge and Nixon, although drawing
a salary, could hardly preside over cases from his prison cell. See infra text accompanying notes 187-
90 & 236. Impeachment and removal of these officials would have been appropriate solely on these
grounds, and Nixon's incarceration undoubtedly was a factor in his case.
30. See infra text accompanying note 183.
31. See infra text accompanying note 217. In recommending impeachment of Judge English, the
House Judiciary Committee expressly dealt with this issue. It wrote:
[I]mpeachment is not confined alone to acts which are forbidden by the Constitution or
Federal statutes. The better sustained and modem view is that the provision for impeachment
in the Constitution applies not only to high crimes and misdemeanors as those words were
1526
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Ritter on six charges of taking kickbacks and tax evasion, as well as a
seventh for bringing his court "into scandal and disrepute." Though the
Senate acquitted him of the six articles charging criminal offenses, the
judge was nonetheless convicted and removed on the seventh article.32
President Andrew Johnson was impeached by the House for, among other
things, giving speeches casting aspersions on Congress. 33 The second and
third articles of impeachment approved by the House Judiciary Committee
against President Richard Nixon charged misuse of government agencies
for improper purposes and refusal to comply with lawful subpoenas of the
Committee.34
In sum, a showing of criminality is not necessary to establish an
impeachable offense. Nonetheless, it may be important to remember that
the historical evidence of the Founders' intentions must be viewed in the
context of their time when by modem reckoning there were very few
criminal laws. At the time the Constitution was ratified, there were no
federal crimes at all, unless one counts those few mentioned in the
Constitution itself, such as treason. The sprawling federal and state
criminal codes of the late twentieth century would have seemed quite
foreign to our eighteenth century forebearers. Much of the official
misconduct, particularly "corruption" and misapplication of public funds,
with which the Framers were concerned when they debated the
impeachment clauses, may have violated no criminal law in their day, but
would fall squarely within a battery of modem federal statutes.35 One may
understood at common law but also acts which are not defined as criminal and made subject
to indictment, but also to those which affect the public welfare.
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT: SELECrED MATERIALS ON PROCEDURE, 93d Cong.
886 (1974) [hereinafter IMPEACHMiENT PROCEDURE].
Thus, an official may be impeached for offenses of a political character and for gross betrayal of
public interests. Also, for abuses or betrayal of trusts, for inexcusable negligence of duty, for the
tyrannical abuse of power, oras one writer puts it, fora
breach of official duty by malfeasance or misfeasance, including conduct such as drunkenness
when habitual, or in the performance of official duties, gross indecency, profanity, obscenity,
or other language used in the discharge of an official function, which tends to bring the office
into disrepute, or an abuse or reckless exercise of discretionary power as well as the breach of
an official duty imposed by statute or common law.
Id.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 225-27. See also Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 293
(1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 668 (1937) (rejecting as non-justiciable the claim of Judge Halstead
Ritter that the Senate convicted and removed him for non-impeachable offenses).
33. See 1 TRIAL OF ANDREv JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 8-10 (Articles X and XI of the Articles
of Impeachment against President Johnson).
34. See Nixon Impeachment Report, supra note 10, at 3-4.
35. Such modem innovations include the wire and mail fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and
1343 (1998); the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962, et seq. (1998); the federal false statements statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1001 (1998); and many others.
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well wonder whether Mason, Madison, or Franklin, if aware of the reach of
modem criminal law, would conclude that there was much, if any, non-
criminal conduct that would now merit impeachment.
B. DISTINGUISHING IMPEACHABLE NON-CRIMINAL CONDUCT FROM
NON-IMPEACHABLE NON-CRIMINAL CONDUCT
1. General Observations
To define the scope of impeachable non-criminal offenses, one must
begin by examining both the text of the impeachment clauses and the place
of the impeachment mechanism within the structure of the Constitution.
The text says that a President may be impeached only for the commission
of "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. 36 It is a
cardinal error to abbreviate this passage and speak of "high crimes and
misdemeanors" in isolation, and so to ignore the fact that the Constitution
gives two concrete examples of the type of offense the Framers intended to
be proper grounds for impeachment. When the Constitution authorizes
impeachment for 'Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors," it is saying that a President may be removed for
committing treason, taking bribes,37 or performing other acts similar both
in type and seriousness to bribery and treason.38
36. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (emphasis added).
37. Giving bribes is not necessarily as serious as taking bribes. Accepting a bribe almost
necessarily involves a public act; that is an act relating to the President's office. Paying a bribe may not
relate to the office, and thus might be far less serious. For example, a President who bribed a college
admissions officer to enroll the President's child may not have committed an impeachable offense.
Even if the bribe were a criminal act, such as payment to a foreign official to do something in the best
interests of the United States, it might not justify impeachment. See infra text accompanying notes 86,
120 & 139-43 (discussing the significance of the conduct's relationship to the accused's office).
38. The canon of statutory construction bearing the Latin title ejusdem generis holds that "where
general words follow an enumeration of particular classes of things, such general words are not to be
construed ... as applying only to things of the same general ... class as those specifically mentioned."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 517 (6th ed. 1990). See also Robert J. Araujo, SJ., Method in
Interpretation: Practical Wisdom and the Search for Meaning in Public Texts, 68 Miss. LJ. 225, 319-
28 (1998) (discussing ejusdem generis and other canons of statutory construction). Applied here,
ejusdem generis suggests that the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" should be construed as
applying only to offenses of the same general class as treason and bribery. In the present case, ordinary
rules of English usage produce the same conclusion. The use of the word "other" is an unequivocal
statement that treason and bribery are merely two examples of the general category of high crimes and
misdemeanors. See Statement of Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 84 (arguing that application of
ejusdem generis to text of Constitution suggests "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" must be of the
same type and degree as treason and bribery).
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Thus, two things may fairly be inferred from the constitutional text.
First, a "high crime or misdemeanor" must be an offense of the most
serious kind. Treason is and always has been punishable by death.3 9
Furthermore, bribery is everywhere considered one of the gravest non-
violent crimes.40  Second, impeachable offenses are public offenses,
offenses that strike at the heart of the democratic order. As Alexander
Hamilton said, such offenses are "of a nature which may with peculiar
propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to the injuries
done to the society itself."''
Over the centuries, observers have employed a variety of formulations
in an effort to capture the essence of transgressions meriting removal of a
head of state (or in England, of his chief ministers). The common law
called them "great offenses."42  An English Solicitor General stated in
Parliament in 1691 that "the power of impeachment ought to be, like
Goliath's sword, kept in the temple, and not used but on great occasions."'
3
In America, James Iredell told the North Carolina ratification convention
that the "occasion for its exercise [impeachment] will arise from acts of
great injury to the community."" Shortly after ratification, in 1790-91,
Supreme Court Justice James Wilson described impeachments in the
United States as "confined to political characters, to political crimes and
misdemeanors, and to political punishment."' 5 Justice Story wrote that
impeachment is "intended for occasional and extraordinary cases, where a
superior power, acting for the whole people, is put into operation to protect
their rights, and to rescue their liberties from violation."46
39. The first treason statute, enacted in 1790, provided death as the penalty for treason. See Act
of Apr. 30. 1790, ch. IX, 1 Stat. 112 (1845) (An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes against the
United States). The current treason statute also permits the death penalty. See 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1998)
(providing that one who is guilty of treason against the United States "shall suffer death" or a term of
imprisonment).
40. Bribery was among the first offenses designated by statute as a federal crime following the
ratification of the Constitution in 1789. See Act of April 30, 1790, ch. IX, § 21, 1 Stat. 112 (1845).
41. THEFEDERALISTNO. 65, at 331 (Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books ed. 1992).
42. George Mason, the originator of the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors," said earlier in
the Convention that he favored impeachment for "great crimes." RECORDS, supra note 12, at 65.
43. BERGER, supra note 9, at 88 (quoting Lord Chancellor Somers, 5 NEw PARLIAMENT
HISTORY 678 (1691)).
44. 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 113 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter DEBATES].
45. 1 JANES WILSON, Lectures on Law, in THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 426 (R. McCloskey
ed., 1967) (1804).
46. STORY, supra note 11, § 749.
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More recently, Raoul Berger concluded that the Founders intended to
"preclude resort to impeachment of the President for petty misconduct,' 47
and that they "conceived that the President would be impeachable for 'great
offenses' such as corruption [or] perfidy."'"8  In the most recent
comprehensive treatment of impeachment, Professor Michael Gerhardt
observed that the ratification debates support the conclusion that high
crimes and misdemeanors "were not limited to indictable offenses, but
rather included great offenses against the federal government."'1 9
The proposition that impeachment of a President should result only
from "great" offenses seems borne out by the actual conduct of the
impeachment proceedings against Presidents Johnson and Nixon. Almost
all of the charges against Andrew Johnson involved his removal of
Secretary of War Stanton in defiance of the Tenure of Office Act. 0
Whatever the technical merits of these charges, the true occasion for the
effort to remove Johnson was an irreconcilable conflict between the
President and the dominant forces in the ruling Republican party over the
issue that would define America for the next century and more-how to
treat the states of the defeated rebellion, and how to regulate the way those
states treated their large populations of recently emancipated African-
American slaves.51 Over time, the conventional wisdom about the Johnson
impeachment effort became that it was a case of congressional
overreaching by a vengeful group of radicals against a President acting
within his rights. Whether or not this a correct view of history, 2 the key
point for our purposes is that, at the time, the majority of both houses of
Congress perceived Johnson's policy of liberality towards rebels and
seeming indifference to the political and economic status of freed slaves as
treasonous betrayals of the cause for which more than two million northern
men fought and over three hundred thousand died. 3 To modem eyes,
47. BERGER, supra note 9, at 90.
48. Id. at298.
49. GERHARDT, supra note 3, at 104-05. See also Impeachment Inquiry Hearing Pursuant to H.
Res. 581, Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 19-20 (statement of Nicholas
Katzenbach).
50. See infra text accompanying notes 191-202.
51. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTs 276 (1992) (discussing the root causes of the
Johnson impeachment effort). See also Statement of Professor Sean Wilentz, supra note 22, at 22.
52. For a brief discussion of the change in the way historians have viewed the Johnson
impeachment, see Bernard A. Weisberger, Impeachment Aftermath: William Jefferson Clinton, Andrew
Johnson, and the Judgment of History, AM. HERITAGE, FebJMar. 1999, at 22.
53. For example, in his written statement explaining his vote in favor of impeachment, Senator
Charles Sumner of Massachusetts characterized President Johnson as "the impersonation of the
tyrannical slave power," and described the impeachment effort as "one of the last great battles with
slavery." 3 TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 247.
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Johnson's removal of Stanton seems a trivial matter and a transparently
specious ground on which to impeach a president. But for his
contemporaries, Johnson's true offenses were quintessential "great crimes."
The impeachment of Richard Nixon likewise turned on "great"
questions of constitutional governance. The three Articles of Impeachment
against President Nixon approved by the House Judiciary Committee
concerned grave abuses of executive power. Article 1 charged criminal
obstruction of the investigation of a burglary carried out by paid agents of
the President's re-election committee to gather political intelligence on the
President's opponents 4 Article 2 alleged pervasive misuse of federal law
enforcement and intelligence agencies for political purposes, notably to
collect information on or to discredit persons opposed to the President's
general political aims or his conduct of the Vietnam War.55 Article 3
sought impeachment based on the President's refusal to comply with the
Judiciary Committee's own subpoenas. 56 Moreover, as with the case of
Andrew Johnson, the Nixon impeachment effort was entwined with a
deeply divisive quarrel about a war and its aftermath. One of the two
articles of impeachment proposed, but not adopted, by the Judiciary
Committee charged the President with concealing the bombing of
Cambodia from Congress through the creation of false military records and
the repeated submission to Congress of overtly false official reports.57
The near-universal theme of the Nixon Judiciary Committee report
and of formal supplemental statements by Committee Members from both
parties was that a President should be impeached only for offenses that go
to the heart of his constitutional responsibilities, and not for any transient or
venal personal failings. The Judiciary Committee staff prepared a report
entitled, "Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment," portions
of which were incorporated into the Committee's final report. In one such
portion, the staff concluded:
Impeachment is a constitutional remedy addressed to serious offenses
against the system of government .. It is not controlling whether
Estimates of the number of men enlisted in the Union Army vary from around 2.1 million to
nearly 2.9 million. Compare VERNON BLYTHE, A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES
383-85 (1914) (placing number of Union enlistees at between 2,772,408 and 2,898,304), with MARK
MAYO BOATNERIII, THE CIVIL WAR DICrTIONARY 602 (1959) (stating that 2,128,948 men served in the
Union Army). There is general agreement that 359,528 Union men were killed by enemy action or died
from disease or accident. See BLYTHE, supra; BOATNER, supra.
54. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1035, at 1-2 (1974).
55. See id. at 3-4.
56. See id. at 4.
57. See id. at 217-19, 338.
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treason and bribery are criminal. More important, they are constitutional
wrongs that subvert the structure of government, or undermine the
integrity of office and even the Constitution itself, and thus are "high"
offenses in the sense the word was used in English impeachments.
Not all presidential misconduct is sufficient to constitute grounds for
impeachment. There is a further requirement-substantiality. In
deciding whether this further requirement has been met, the facts must be
considered as a whole in the context of the office, not in terms of
separate or isolated events. Because impeachment of a President is a
grave step for the nation, it is to be predicated only upon conduct
seriously incompatible with either the constitutional form and principles
of our government or the proper performance of constitutional duties of
the presidential office. 58
Among those who voted for impeachment, Congressman Conyers
wrote that the impeachment remedy "was framed with the intention that it
be used only as a last constitutional resort against the danger of executive
tyranny. ''5 9  Another group of Members declared that, "In these
proceedings we have sought to return to the fundamental limitations on
Presidential power contained in the Constitution and to reassert the right of
the people to self-government through their elected representatives within
that Constitutional framework. 6°  Congressman Waldie said,
"Impeachment of a President should not be undertaken to punish a
President, but to constitutionally redefine and to constitutionally limit the
powers of the Presidency when those powers have been dangerously
extended and abused.' Several Members who voted for impeachment did
so because the President's conduct, in their view, "violated our guarantees
of liberty,"62 or was a "grave threat to the liberties of the American
people." 63 Referring in particular to Article 3 concerning the President's
defiance of congressional subpoenas, Congressman McClory observed that
the "power of impeachment is the Constitution's paramount power of self-
preservation."
64
58. Id. at 6-8.
59. Id. at 289.
60. Id. at 327 (Statement of Congresswoman Holtzman, joined by Congressmen Kastenmeier,
Edwards, Hungate, Conyers, Waldie, Drinan, Rangel, Owens, and Mezvinsky).
61. Id. at297.
62. Id. at 341 (Statement of Congressman Wayne Owens).
63. Id. at 287 (Supplemental Views of Congressman Don Edwards).
64. Id. at 349 (McClory was joined by Congressmen Danielson and Fish).
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Those who voted against all of the Nixon articles of impeachment
endorsed the minority report which concluded that impeachment was
constitutionally permissible only for the commission of crimes, and then
only for "extremely grave crimes."65 Congressman Hutchinson wrote
separately to emphasize that, "Impeachment of a President is a drastic
remedy and should be resorted to only in cases where the offenses
committed by him are so grave as to make his continuance in office
intolerable." 6
6
In the Nixon impeachment, the rhetoric of the Judiciary Committee
was matched by its actions. Confronted with evidence that President Nixon
may have committed the essentially private crime of criminal income tax
fraud and may have illegally received government money to pay for
improvements on his private estates at San Clemente, California, and Key
Biscayne, Florida, the Committee voted 26-12 against impeaching the
President on these grounds.
Thus, both the phrase "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors" and the precedent of the two pre-Clinton presidential
impeachment proceedings strongly suggest that presidents are to be
impeached only for "great" transgressions that present a real danger to the
constitutional order. This conclusion is also implicit in the role of the
Executive in our Constitution. The President is co-equal with the Congress
and the Judiciary. The office is attained by direct grant of the people,67 and
does not rest on any delegation of power from the legislature. As an
original matter, the Framers, fresh from their struggle with the
parliamentary tyrannies of the mother country, were as concerned with
legislative overreaching as they were with the prospect of an "imperial
presidency." 68 Dramatically lowering the impeachment threshold invites
conversion of impeachment into a mechanism for legislative removal of the
65. Id. at 349 (McClory was joined by Congressmen Danielson and Fish).
66. Id. at 495.
67. Of course, technically the Electoral College stands as intermediary between the voters and
selection of the President, but only twice in American history has a candidate won the popular vote, but
lost the presidency in the Electoral College. See LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & NEAL R. PEIRCE, THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE PRIMER 26,46-47 (1996).
68. See THORNTON ANDERSON, CREATING THE CONSTITUTION 143 (1993). The phrase
"imperial presidency" was coined by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. in his 1974 book of that name. See
generally ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973). See also ERWIN C.
HARGROVE, THE POWER OF THE MODERN PRESIDENCY vii (1974) (discussing concern that presidency
"has become a kind of republican monarchy").
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chief executive on a vote of no confidence, and is therefore antithetical to
the design of this Constitution.
69
2. Judicial Impeachment Precedents
The nation's experience with impeachment of federal judges arguably
supports the view that federal officers may be removed for non-criminal
conduct far different and less grave than the "great" offenses. As the
Appendix details, judges have been impeached for drunkenness,
blasphemy, entering improper judicial orders,70 bias in charging a grand
jury,"1 improperly holding in contempt a lawyer who had criticized the
court's rulings,72 habitual malperformance,73 using favoritism in appointing
69. This loint was made forcefully by the dissenting members of the Judiciary Committee in the
Nixon impeachment:
We have never had a British parliamentary system in this country, and we have never adopted
the device of a parliamentary vote of no-confidence in the chief executive. If it is thought
desirable to adopt such a system of government, the proper way to do so is by amending our
written Constitution-not by removing the President.
H.R. REP. No. 93-1305, at 365 (Minority Views of Messrs. Hutchinson, Smith, Sandman, Wiggins,
Dennis, Mayne, Lott, Moorhead, Maraziti and Latta).
In his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee during the Clinton impeachment inquiry,
former Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach observed:
If [the impeachment] power is not limited-as it clearly is-then any President could be
removed if a sufficient number of members of the House and Senators simply disagreed with
his policies, thus converting impeachment into a Parliamentary vote of no confidence.
Whatever its merits, that is not our Constitutional system.
Statement of Nicholas Katzenbach, supra note 49, at 19. See also Statement of James Hamilton, id. at
224. During the debate in the House on the Clinton articles of impeachment, Congresswoman Jackson
Lee declared:
Today, our vote leads into the darkness of a vile attack on the Constitution. We leave here
today void and empty because our president will have been toppled against the will of the
people of the United States. Mr. President, if you can hear me, do not resign. This is not a
parliamentarian [sic] form of government.
House Floor Debate on Four Articles of Impeachment Against President Clinton, F.D.C.H., Dec. 18,
1998, available in 1998 WL 883521.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his book discussing the impeachment trials and eventual acquittals of
Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase and President Andrew Johnson, concluded that:
The importance of these acquittals can hardly be overstated. With respect to the chief
executive, they have meant that as to the policies he sought to pursue, he would be answerable
only to the country as a whole in the quadrennial presidential elections, and not to Congress
through the process of impeachment.
REHNQUIST, supra note 51, at 271.
70. See infra text accompanying note 176; GERHARDT, supra note 3, at 50 (both describing the
impeachment of Judge John Pickering).
71. See infra text accompanying note 183 (describing the impeachment of Supreme Court Justice
Samuel Chase).
72. See infra text accompanying note 185 (describing the impeachment of Judge James H. Peck).
73. See infra text accompanying note 217 (describing the impeachment of Judge George
English).
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receivers,74 and bringing the court into scandal and disrepute.7 5  However,
we join with the majority of commentators who have concluded that the
impeachment standard for judges is different than the standard for the
President.76 At least five reasons support this conclusion.
First, the constitutional text creates some ambiguity about the proper
impeachment standard for judges. Article II authorizes impeachment of the
"President, Vice President and all civil Officers" for "Treason, Bribery, or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." However, Article I provides that
federal judges "shall hold their Offices during good Behavior." While the
impeachment standard in Article II certainly does apply to judges, the
additional language in Article III suggests an additional-and perhaps
lesser-basis for their impeachment and removal.
77
Second, in marked contrast to the profound political questions and
great occasions that precipitated the impeachment efforts against Presidents
Johnson and Nixon, the impeachments of judges seem rather tawdry affairs
generally revolving around charges of personal incapacity,78 political or
personal bias,79 or, more commonly, financial dishonesty. 80  No president
74. See infra text accompanying note 222 (describing the impeachment of Judge Harold
Louderback).
75. See infra text accompanying note 225 (describing the impeachment of Judge Halstead L.
Ritter).
76. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 9, at 122-80; GERHARDT, supra note 3; Constitutional
Grounds for Presidential Impeachment: Modem Precedents, Minority Views, 105th Cong., Ser. No. 17,
at 16 (Dec. 1998) (judges and Presidents "are and should be subject to differing impeachment
considerations"); Statement of Nicholas Katzenbach, supra note 49 at 18; Statement of Bruce
Ackerman, id. at 44; Statement of Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 88 ("[T]he standard for
impeaching the President has been much higher [than for impeaching judges], and properly so.").
77. The Report of the House Judiciary Committee proposing impeachment of Judge George
English expressly indicated that the constitutional provision limiting the tenure of federal judges to their
good behavior should be considered along with the Article II, § 4 standard applicable to all other civil
officers. The Report continued: "[g]ood behavior is the essential condition on which the tenure of
judicial office rests, and any act committed or omitted by the incumbent in violation of this condition
necessarily works a forfeiture of the office." IMPEACHMENT PROCEDURE, supra note 31, at 886.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 176 & 217 for descriptions of the impeachment of Judges
Pickering (drunkenness, blasphemy, senility, and improper rulings) and English (habitual
malperformance).
79. See infra text accompanying notes 183, 185 & 222 for descriptions of the impeachment of
Judges Chase (bias in charging grand jury and delivering inflammatory political harangue to grand
jury), Peck (improperly holding in contempt lawyer who criticized his rulings), and Louderback (using
favoritism in appointing receivers).
80. See infra text accompanying notes 211, 214, 225, 230 & 233 for descriptions of the
impeachment of Judges Swayne (falsifying expense accounts and using property held in a receivership);
'Archbald (bribery and hearing cases in which he had a financial interest); Ritter (taking kickbacks and
tax evasion); Clalborne (tax evasion); Hastings (conspiracy to solicit a bribe). In addition, two judges
who resigned to avoid impeachment, Judge Mark W. Delahay and Judge Robert Collins, were charged
with questionable financial dealings and bribery respectively. See also GERHARDT, supra note 3, at 23.
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has been impeached for general failure or incapacity to perform his duties.
Several judges have been. No president has been impeached for being
politically biased or for favoring friends in the exercise of official duties.
Several judges have been. Two judges have been impeached and one
convicted of tax evasion, yet the House Judiciary Committee declined to
impeach Richard Nixon for income tax violations. In short, historical
precedent suggests that judges are treated differently. Congress seems
more disposed to impeach judges than presidents for incapacity or
fundamental unsuitability for office.
Third, judges have life tenure: they continue in office until death or
resignation unless removed through impeachment. In contrast, presidential
tenure is limited to four years and an impeachment issue often arises when
substantially less than the whole term remains. s8 Indeed, this distinction
almost prompted the Constitutional Convention not to subject presidents to
impeachment at all. s2
Fourth, judges are appointed while presidents are elected. This is not
a trivial distinction. One of the notable differences between the American
constitutional democracy and its English progenitor is the federal
constitution's textual command that elections be conducted with
metronomic regularity-congressional elections every two years,
presidential elections every four.8 3  The legitimacy of American
government is so dependent on regular ratification by the electorate that the
biennial timetable has never been disrupted, and national elections were
conducted routinely during both the Civil War 4 and World War ]I85 with
81. Andrew Johnson was impeached with about one year remaining in his term. The House
Judiciary Committee voted articles of impeachment against President Nixon when he had about two and
a half years left in his term and was ineligible for re-election. President Clinton's impeachment
occurred when he had just over two years left on his term and was also ineligible for re-election.
Indeed, during the trial, President Clinton went past the half-way mark of his term, thereby
guaranteeing that Vice President Gore would be eligible for two full terms as President even if Clinton
had been convicted and removed. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1.
82. During the debates about impeachment, Rufus King argued that the president should not be
subject to impeachment because of the rather short term associated with the office. Benjamin Franklin
suggested, however, that without impeachment a chief magistrate who made himself obnoxious might
be assassinated, which deprived the magistrate not only of life, but also of the opportunity to vindicate
his character. He contended it would be better to provide punishment "when his misconduct should
deserve it, and for his honorable acquittal when he should be unjustly accused." RECORDS, supra note
12, at 65. While Franklin's views carried the day, the point remains that the different tenures are a
reasoned basis for applying the constitutional standard differently. Indeed, the rather limited debates in
the Constitutional Convention regarding impeachment were focused almost exclusively on the President
and other senior officers. Little attention was devoted to removal of judges.
83. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
84. Abraham Lincoln so despaired of his own re-election that in August 1864, he jotted a
memorandum that read:
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no apparent thought that any other option was possible. Because the tenure
of any American President is legitimized only by the ballot box, the
mandate conferred by the electorate is not lightly to be repealed. Any
effort to undo the results of an election-which is the practical
consequence of presidential, but not judicial, impeachments-should be
undertaken with great care and only in cases of great need.
Finally, any effort to remove a President precipitates a constitutional
crisis, even if the charges against the President are not themselves of
constitutional magnitude. A change in presidents requires, or at least
permits, a reordering of the executive branch and unforeseeable changes in
national policy. The removal of a lower federal court judge has no
necessary consequence outside his or her own district or circuit, and only
modest effects even there. Even the removal of a Supreme Court Justice
may have no noticeable impact on the Court's decisions.
For all these reasons, it seems that the nature of an impeachable
offense under the constitution depends largely on the nature of the office
from which the subject is to be removed.86 For example, judges are
expected to be apolitical and impartial. Exercising the powers of one's
office to favor one's friends and allies or to advance partisan political goals
is conduct fundamentally incompatible with the judicial role, and is thus
impeachable conduct for a judge. However, the same sort of behavior is
often the essence of being a President. Absent violation of some statute, a
President will not be impeached for exercising the powers of patronage or
This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration
will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to so co-operate with the President elect, as to
save the Union between the election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his election
on such ground that he cannot possibly save it afterwards.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Third Lincoln-Douglas Debate, Sept. 15, 1858, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES
AND WRITINGS, 1859-65, at 624 (Library of America ed. 1989). For a general discussion of the election
of 1864, see STEPHEN B. OATES, "WIVH MALICE TOWARD NONE: THE LIFE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 380-
99 (1977).
85. For example, in the summer of 1944, President Franklin D. Roosevelt declined a request
from Winston Churchill to meet and discuss the post-war fate of Poland, pleading concern about the
upcoming presidential election. See MARTIN GILBERT, CH. RCHILL: A L1FE784 (1991).
86. The staff of the House Judiciary Committee in the Nixon presidential impeachment took the
view that the standard for impeachment of judges is no different than the standard for presidents, but
agreed with our reading of the judicial impeachment cases insofar as we take them to involve "an
assessment of the conduct of the officer in terms of the constitutional duties of his office."
Constitutional Grounds, supra note 11, at 17. See also Statement of Nicholas Katzenbach, supra note
49, at 18-19:
Only if one takes the view articulated by Senator Fessenden in the Johnson impeachment that
impeachment is a power "to be exercised with extreme caution" in "extreme cases" can the
same standard apply to both Presidents and judges. One simply needs to take into
consideration the different roles and responsibilities of the offices involved.
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using the office to advance a political agenda. The nature of the
presidential office is so fundamentally different than the nature of any
judgeship, that the constitutional standard for impeaching a President
should reflect that difference.
3. Impeachable Non-criminal Offenses-Distinguishing Features and
Special Cases
What then are the distinguishing features of non-criminal impeachable
offenses for presidents? Such offenses surely include most of the "great"
political infractions recognized under English common law, including
misapplication of funds, abuse of official power, neglect of duty, or
encroachment on the prerogatives of another co-equal branch of
government.87 Virtually all of the charges against Presidents Johnson and
Nixon were criminal, fell into one of the common law "great offense"
categories, or both. In the Johnson case, Articles 1 through 9 were
essentially claims of abuse of power and were also technically criminal
because they charged violation of the Tenure of Office Act, which carried
criminal penalties.88  Article 11 charged an encroachment on the
prerogatives of the legislative branch, because Johnson had allegedly
declared the 39th Congress "was not a Congress authorized by the
Constitution to exercise legislative power" and that he was therefore not
bound to enforce its statutes.89 All three articles approved by the Nixon
Judiciary Committee arguably fall under the rubric of abuse of power, and
Article 1 charging obstruction of justice clearly alleged criminal conduct.90
Of the two articles proposed but not adopted in 1974, the article concerning
concealment of the bombing of Cambodia implicated both abuse of
presidential power and a serious intrusion into the constitutional
warmaking power of Congress, while the article charging tax evasion was
plainly criminal 91
Two charges from the pre-Clinton presidential impeachments raise
issues that do not fit comfortably within the traditional "great offense"
categories: Article 3 in the case against Richard Nixon alleging resistance
87. See BERGER, supra note 9, at 70.
88. See infra text accompanying note 198 (describing the articles of impeachment against
President Johnson).
89. IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS, infra note 173, at 154-60.
90. For text of the articles of impeachment against President Nixon approved by the House
Judiciary Committee, see H.R. REP. No. 93-1035, at 1-4 (1974). For discussion of the these articles,
see supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
91. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1305, at 217-23 (text of articles of impeachment against President
Nixon proposed, but not approved, by the House Judiciary Committee).
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to congressional subpoenas as an impeachable offense, and Article 10
against Andrew Johnson asserting that his public speeches casting
aspersions on Congress were grounds for removal. Although Article 10 of
the Johnson case can be readily dismissed as an artifact of the particular
virulence of that dispute, Article 3 in the Nixon impeachment raises the
more difficult question of the limits of a President's power to contest
investigative requests from Congress or other investigators. This same
question resurfaced in the case of President Clinton.
a. Presidential resistance to congressional investigative efforts: In
response to a series of subpoenas issued by the House Judiciary
Committee, President Nixon refused to produce certain tape recordings and
documents, asserting the novel theory that the doctrine of separation of
powers gave him an "executive privilege" to refuse the Committee's
investigative requests. 2  At the same time, the President was resisting
criminal subpoenas from the Watergate Special Prosecutor's Office seeking
some of the same material. It was only after the Supreme Court ruled
unanimously that the President must comply with the criminal subpoenas
93
that the Judiciary Committee also received materials it had demanded. 94
The Committee felt that the refusal to comply with congressional
subpoenas was a transgression sufficiently grave and sufficiently distinct
from the criminal obstruction of justice charged in Article 1 so as to merit a
separate article of impeachment. As the Committee Report observed:
Whatever the limits of legislative power in other contexts-and whatever
need may otherwise exist for preserving the confidentiality of
Presidential conversations-in the context of an impeachment
proceeding the balance was struck in favor of the power of inquiry when
the impeachment provision was written into the Constitution.95
In the Clinton case, the House Judiciary Committee reported four
articles of impeachment to the full House, the fourth charging "misuse and
abuse" of the office of the Presidency. 96 As originally drafted by majority
counsel for consideration in the Judiciary Committee, the fourth article
charged four separate types of abuse of power, including: frivolous
92. The Committee Report noted that, with one possible exception, none of the subjects of the
sixty-nine previous impeachment inquiries had ever asserted a privilege to refuse compliance with a
legislative subpoena. See id. at 206.
93. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,713-14 (1974).
94. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1305, at 190. The Committee report also contains substantial evidence
that the disclosures the President did make contained intentional omissions as well as false and
misleading material. See, e.g., id. at 203-05.
95. Id. at209.
96. H.R. Res. 611, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998).
15391999]
HeinOnline  -- 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1539 1998-1999
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAWREVIEW
assertions of executive privilege in response to subpoenas directed to White
House officials by the Office of Independent Counsel; 97 and failing to
respond to a list of eighty-one written questions from the House Judiciary
Committee and making "perjurious, false and misleading sworn
statements" in response to those written questions. 98  On December 12,
1998, Congressman Gekas (R-Pa.) successfully moved in committee to
amend the fourth proposed article by deleting its first three paragraphs,
including the allegation of abuse of executive privilege in disputes with the
Independent Counsel.99 As reported to the full House, Article 4 alleged
only failures to respond appropriately to inquiries from the Judiciary
Committee itself (the eighty-one questions). 1°° In the full House, Article 4
was defeated and did not become a part of the Bill of Impeachment
presented to the Senate. 01
The Nixon and Clinton cases present striking parallels and contrasts.
First, the Nixon Judiciary Committee differentiated sharply between
President Nixon's legal contest with the Watergate Special Prosecutor over
criminal subpoenas and his refusal to respond to congressional subpoenas
issued in the course of an impeachment inquiry. At no point did the
Judiciary Committee assert that President Nixon's battle with the Special
Prosecutor over criminal discovery was a constitutional misdeed. Rather,
in its third impeachment article, the Committee alleged that by defying its
own subpoenas, the President "assum[ed] to himself functions and
judgments necessary to the exercise of the sole power of impeachment
vested by the Constitution in the House of Representatives."' 10 2
The Clinton Judiciary Committee followed the same pattern, albeit
with obvious reluctance. Republican committee members thought
seriously about impeaching President Clinton for too-vigorously using the
tools of the law to frustrate the Independent Counsel's investigation, but
shrank from it in the end. Like their Watergate-era predecessors, however,
they were willing to defend Congress' constitutional prerogative of
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. See House Judiciary Committee Holds Hearing on Articles of Impeachment, F.D.C.H., Dec.
18, 1998, available in 1998 WL 857390.
100. See id.
101. See 144 CONG. REC. H12042 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1998) (on the adoption of Art. IV: yeas 148,
nays 285, not voting 2).
102. H.R. REP. NO.93-1305, at 4.
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investigating impeachable offenses by voting to impeach a President who,
in their view, defied Congress itself.1 °3
Second, a comparison of the Nixon and Clinton cases demonstrates-
unsurprisingly-that congressional response to presidential "stonewalling"
depends heavily on the nature of the alleged wrongdoing being investigated
and the value to the investigation of the information a President resists
providing. In Watergate, there was never any real dispute that the most
serious allegations against President Nixon, if true, would merit
impeachment. The question was always whether the President was guilty,
or in Howard Baker's famous phrase, "What did the President know, and
when did he know it?"1 4 Until the disclosure of the "smoking gun" White
House tapes proving Nixon's complicity in criminal obstruction of justice,
neither Congress, nor the Special Prosecutor, nor the public knew all the
critical facts. Consequently, by defying congressional subpoenas, President
Nixon truly was withholding evidence essential to the determination of his
suitability to remain in office. Implicit, but unmistakable, in the Nixon
Judiciary Committee report and its vote to approve Article 3 against
President Nixon was the judgment that Nixon's assertion of "executive
privilege" was a flimsy and legally unjustifiable excuse for selectively
withholding evidence that was both central to the resolution of charges of
obviously constitutional magnitude and known by the President to be so.
1 0 5
Indeed, once President Nixon produced additional tapes in compliance with
the Supreme Court's order, the Committee's surmise about the nature of
the withheld material was fully born out by its contents. The material was
so damaging that it led almost immediately to the President's
resignation. 10
6
Clinton's case was different. From the moment the presidential sex
scandal broke in January 1998, the nation was torn by passionate
disagreement over whether the allegations, even if true, should be
investigated at all, much less serve as grounds for impeachment.
103. Indeed, the fourth article of impeachment against President Clinton in the version reported to
the full House appropriated language directly from Article 3 in the President Nixon case, alleging that
Clinton "assumed to himself functions and judgments necessary to the exercise of the sole power of
impeachment vested by the Constitution in the House of Representatives." H.R. Res. 611, supra note
96.
104. THEODORE H. WHrTE, BREACH OF FArFH: THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON 236 (1975).
105. H.R. REP. No. 93-1305, at 187-213 (discussing Committee's conclusions regarding the third
article of impeachment against President Nixon). The Committee's discussion of executive privilege
and its pointed conclusions regarding the untrustworthiness of tape transcripts provided by the White
House are particularly noteworthy. See id. at 203-12.
106. See WHiTE., supra note 104, at 1-35 (describing how release of the tapes in response to the
Supreme Court's order of July 24, 1974, led to President Nixon's resignation on August 9, 1974).
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Moreover, by the time the Independent Counsel submitted his referral- to
Congress, there was little question about the facts. The eighty-one
interrogatories submitted to President Clinton by the Judiciary Committee
had no real investigative purpose, since they sought nothing but admissions
concerning President Clinton's state of mind at the time he answered
various questions during the Jones civil deposition and the Independent
Counsel interview before the grand jury. 107 Significantly, Clinton did not
dispute the Committee's right to ask questions, and he did answer them,
albeit in the way civil litigants customarily answer interrogatories-
carefully, elliptically, evasively, even disingenuously. 08  In the end, the
full House was unconvinced that the President's answers were a sufficient
affront to its impeachment authority to warrant a constitutional
confrontation and failed to approve the fourth article of impeachment
charging abuse of power.10 9
The Watergate Judiciary Committee was surely correct in concluding
that the impeachment power necessarily implies a congressional power to
inquire about presidential wrongdoing, 11° as well as a corresponding
obligation on the part of the President to respond to such inquiries.
Moreover, we do not view the refusal of the House of Representatives to
impeach President Clinton for his lawyerly responses to the eighty-one
questions as precedent to the contrary (though a future President faced with
an aggressive congressional impeachment investigation will undoubtedly
want to interpret it in just that way). Considered impartially, the House
vote on Article 4 most likely flowed from an evaluation of the specifics of
President Clinton's answers and a judgment about their significance to the
overall controversy, rather than from a repudiation of the House's right to
demand responses to its questions. This is not to say that a President could
107. The 81 questions and the President's responses appear at Presentations by Investigative
Counsel: Impeachment Inquiry Pursuant to H. Res. 581 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
105th Cong. 251-74 (1998).
108. As but one minor example, consider the question and answer to Request No. 75:
Request 75: Do you admit or deny having knowledge that Betsy Wright was contacted or
employed to make contact with or gather information about witnesses or potential witnesses
in any judicial proceeding relating to any matter in which you are or could be involved?
Response to Request No. 75: Ms. Betsy Wright was my long-time chief of staff when I was
Governor of Arkansas, and she remains a good friend and trusted advisor. Because of her
great knowledge of Arkansas, from time to time my legal counsel and I have consulted her on
a wide range of matters.
Id. at 271.
109. See 144 CONG. REc. H12042 (dally ed. Dec. 19, 1998)
110. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1305, supra note 10, at 213. See also supra text accompanying notes
92-95. But see BLACK, supra note 11, at 20-23 (arguing that a President is privileged to withhold
certain information, particularly information affecting national security, even from a congressional
impeachment inquiry).
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never properly refuse to answer a question posed by a congressional
committee considering impeachment. Nonetheless, judging the propriety
of such a refusal would be a "political" rather than a "legal" choice, in the
sense that there is no body of law delineating proper and improper areas of
inquiry. The judgment would be "political" in that Congress is free to
consider any refusal in making its impeachment decision. I I'
b. Presidential resistance to inquiries by an Independent Counsel or
other non-congressional investigator. As noted above, the House Judiciary
Committee distinguished between President Nixon's refusals to answer its
subpoenas and his legal battles over production of evidence with the
Watergate Special Prosecutor by voting to impeach the President on the
former, but not on the latter. A quarter-century later, the Committee
appears to have drawn the same distinction by deleting from its proposed
fourth article of impeachment against President Clinton allegations of
improper assertions of executive privilege in response to subpoenas from
the Independent Counsel."' Taken together, the Nixon and Clinton
impeachment precedents suggest that presidential resistance to a criminal
investigation by a non-congressional investigator is not an impeachable
offense, so long as that resistance takes the form of asserting in court
colorable claims of privilege."13
Nonetheless, the difference in status between the Watergate Special
Prosecutor, a purely executive branch official appointed by the Attorney
General, and the Office of Independent Counsel, an odd hybrid both in and
out of all three constitutional branches of government l 4 could give rise to
111. For example, while a President, like any other citizen, would be free to assert his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in an impeachment inquiry due to a well-founded fear
of prosecution in the criminal courts, an impeachment is not itself a "criminal case" for Fifth
Amendment purposes and thus Congress may draw adverse inferences from a refusal to answer. See,
e.g., Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955) (Fifth Amendment available to witnesses testifying
before a Congressional committee, to be claimed only when a reasonable apprehension the answer will
lead to a criminal conviction); United States ex reL Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923)
(inferences from silence may be drawn during deportation hearings); Harrison v. Wille, 132 F.3d 679,
683 (1 lth Cir. 1998) (adverse inference may be drawn from public employee's refusal to answer).
112. See supra text accompanying note 110.
113. An outright refusal to respond to a lawful subpoena or to comply with a judicial order
compelling compliance with such a subpoena would present a different case. For example, if President
Nixon had refused to comply with the Supreme Court's ruling enforcing Leon Jaworski's subpoenas,
impeachment on that ground alone would have been appropriate.
114. See 28 U.S.C. § 592 (preliminary investigation and application for the appointment of
independent counsel is governed by the Attorney General); § 594 (an independent counsel has "full
power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions"); § 593
("court shall appoint appropriate independent counsel"); § 595 ("Congress shall have oversight
jurisdiction with respect to the official conduct of the independent counsel"); § 592 (independent
counsel may be removed "only be personal action of the Attorney General") (1998).
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troubling questions in the future. If one considers an Independent Counsel
the current analog of the Watergate Special Prosecutor, then the Nixon and
Clinton precedents suggest that a President's resistance to subpoenas from
either source encroaches on no legislative prerogative and is thus no ground
for impeachment. However, the picture becomes murkier if one sees the
Independent Counsel Statute as a de jure or at least de facto delegation of a
portion of the Congress' power to investigate impeachable offenses against
high executive officials to the Office of Independent Counsel. In this view,
resistance to the investigation of the Independent Counsel is tantamount to
defiance of Congress itself.
Such a construction of the Independent Counsel Statute would be
deeply troubling. We do not believe that Congress may delegate any part
of its constitutional impeachment authority to an official who is
accountable to both the head of an executive department-the Attorney
General-and to a panel of judges. n 5 Nor do we think that conclusions
drawn by the Judiciary Committee in 1974 about President Nixon's direct
challenge to congressional investigative authority are plausibly transferable
to a contest between a President and an Independent Counsel. Put simply,
we find it difficult to conceive that raising legal objections in legal forums
to the investigative requests of an Independent Counsel could constitute a
high crime or misdemeanor.
c. Other forms of non-criminal misconduct: Two other forms of non-
criminal presidential misbehavior-personal immorality and lying-are
often the subject of discussions concerning impeachment and were central
to the Clinton impeachment debate.
i. Personal immorality: Before the impeachment of President
Clinton, only one person has ever been impeached, even in part, for
conduct that could fairly be characterized as purely personal immorality.
In 1804, Judge John Pickering of the New Hampshire District Court was
impeached because, among other things, he "in a most profane and
indecent manner, [did] invoke the name of the Supreme Being, to the evil
example of the good citizens of the United States."11 6 However, Pickering
was also charged and convicted for making a series of improper rulings and
115. For an excellent discussion of the impeachment referral provisions of the Independent
Counsel Statute, see Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Interaction Between Impeachment and the Independent
Counsel Statute, 86 GEO. LJ. 2193, 2195-96 (1998) (concluding that the impeachment referral
provision of the Independent Counsel Statute should be abandoned).
116. See infra text accompanying note 176.
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being drunk on the bench. Moreover, the true reason for his removal
appears to have been that he was insane.1 17
As for private sexual immorality, there seems little constitutional basis
for concluding that such behavior could ever constitute an impeachable
offense. No federal official has ever been impeached for sexual
misconduct. Such history as there is on the point is negative and anecdotal,
but supports the view that neither the Framers nor anyone since has
seriously proposed impeachment as a remedy for private sexual
misbehavior. For example, in 1792-93, Alexander Hamilton defused a
congressional investigation into his financial relationship with a convicted
swindler by telling the congressmen who came to question him that he had
committed adultery with the man's wife and later paid him to hush up the
affair." 8 Similarly, the unsuccessful effort to unseat Justice William 0.
Douglas began with questions about his character arising from his
supposed promiscuity; however, the impeachment inquiry itself never
dignified these scurrilous allegations with serious attention, focusing
instead on the sources of Justice Douglas' extra-judicial income.119
Of course, merely because the alleged misconduct of a President has a
sexual component does not mean it is exempt from consideration by this
Committee under the impeachment clauses. Criminal sexual misbehavior
such as rape, child sexual assault, and the like, would surely be an
impeachable offense. Even consensual sexual conduct might warrant
impeachment. For example, a president's adulterous entanglement with the
spouse of a foreign head of state or dignitary could significantly impact
foreign relations, and thus could relate directly to the political functions of
the presidency so as to subject a President to impeachment. For the
present, however, it is sufficient to say that no actual impeachment case has
presented such an unusual confluence of the sexual and the political.
ii. Lying: Even leaving to one side the special problem of perjury,
which is discussed below, presidential lies present a particularly knotty
problem. Everyone lies sometimes, and it would be absurd to hold
Presidents to an inhuman standard of unfailing truthfulness. Moreover, a
President is head of state, diplomat, and practicing politician rolled into
one. A certain amount of dissimulation is necessary to the successful
practice of statecraft. Nonetheless, certain kinds of presidential falsehoods
117. See GERHARDT, supra note 3, at 50.
118. See Robert Pear, Clinton Lawyers Compare His Travails to Hamilton's, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Oct. 4, 1998, at A8. See generally CLAUDE G. BOWERS, JEFFERSON AND HAMILTON (1925).
119. See JAMES F. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY: THE LIFE OF WILuAMi 0. DOUGLAS 391-409
(1980). See also GERHARDT, supra note 3, at 107.
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are probably high crimes and misdemeanors, even when they are not
delivered under oath.
The best example of an impeachable, but nonperjurious, lie would be a
false statement made in the President's official capacity to the legislature or
the judiciary for the purpose of deceiving the other branch in its execution
of a core constitutional function. As James Iredell, one of the first Supreme
Court Justices said in debate over the impeachment clauses, "The President
must certainly be punishable for giving false information to the Senate." 120
Only one article of impeachment relying on this principle has ever been
advanced, Article IV of the Nixon impeachment charging concealment of
the bombing of Cambodia through the creation of false military documents
and submission to Congress of false official reports on the war in Southeast
Asia. Although the Judiciary Committee did not approve Article IV, the
vote probably resulted from a disinclination to inject the explosive politics
of the Vietnam War into a case where ample ground for impeachment
already existed, rather than a rejection of the principle that the Chief
Executive may not intentionally deceive Congress in matters that relate to
the legislature's own constitutional duties.
The more difficult case to analyze is one involving allegations that a
President lied to The People in public statements on important national
issues. Although a few observers have intimated a general presidential
obligation of public candor on pain of impeachment, no impeachment has
ever gone forward on this basis12 1 and it seems a very malleable and
dangerous doctrine. The more desirable constitutional remedy for
falsehoods of this sort probably rests in the hands of the public itself when
it uses the ballot box.
120. In the North Carolina ratification debates, Iredell stated that the "President must certainly be
punishable for giving false information to the Senate" in connection with a proposed treaty, and
suggested that the same result would apply if the President failed to give the Senate full information,
but instead concealed important intelligence which ought to have been communicated. DEBATES, supra
note 44, at 126-28. Iredell's comments were quoted by Congresswoman Holtzman during the
proceedings against President Nixon. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1305, at 327.
121. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 93-1305, at 295 (additional views ofMr. Conyers):
By the same policies of secrecy and deception [regarding Cambodia], Richard Nixon also
violated a principal tenet of democratic government: that the President, like every other
elected official, is accountable to the people. For how can the people hold their President to
account if he deliberately and consistently lies to them? The people cannot judge if they do
not know, and President Nixon did everything within his power to keep them in ignorance.
Id. Congressman Conyers may have been alluding to Article I, paragraph 8 of the Articles of
Impeachment approved by the Judiciary Committee against President Nixon. That paragraph alleged
that false public statements were one of nine means employed to carry out a criminal scheme to obstruct
justice. It is difficult, however, to find in this paragraph an endorsement of a general obligation of
presidential honesty.
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4. Non-criminal Impeachable Offenses-Summary
The hallmarks of impeachable offenses not technically criminal are
their magnitude and their public, political character. Congressman
Danielson of the Nixon Judiciary Committee put it well:
It is enough to support impeachment that the conduct complained of be
conduct which is grossly incompatible with the office held and which is
subversive of that office and of our Constitutional system of government.
With respect to a President of the United States ... conduct which
constitutes a substantial breach of his oath of office, is impeachable
conduct 1
22
C. NOT ALL CRIMINAL CONDUCr IS A PROPER GROUND FOR
IMPEACHMENT
Not all violations of criminal statutes are "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors." 123 If the Framers had wanted any crime to be a valid basis
for impeachment, they knew how to say so. Their debates, the original
restriction of impeachment by the Committee of Eleven to the crimes of
treason and bribery, and the Convention's final choice of moderately
expanded language, all demonstrate a sensible intention to exclude some
crimes from the category of impeachable offenses. Their judgment was
sound. Jaywalking, public drunkenness, and reckless driving are all
crimes, and offenses such as hunting without a license in a wildlife refuge
are crimes punishable by six months imprisonment, 124 but a President self-
evidently should not be displaced for committing them.
125
Not even all felonies are necessarily impeachable offenses. For
example, punching a "foreign official" in the nose, 126 destroying a
document belonging to the estate of a debtor,127 operating a bus or train
while intoxicated, 128 counterfeiting a postage stamp, 129 and obliterating the
vehicle identification number of someone else's car 130 are all federal
122. Id. at 303 (additional views of Mr. Danielson).
123. See GERHARDT, supra note 3, at 106 ("Not all statutory crimes demonstrate unfitness for
office"); Statement of Professor Sean Wilentz, supra note 22, at 20 ("The scholars agree that not all
criminal acts are necessarily impeachable acts.").
124. See 18 U.S.C. § 41 (1998).
125. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 294 (2d ed. 1988) (jaywalking
or speeding "obviously would not be an adequate basis for presidential removal.").
126. 18 U.S.C. § 112(a) (1998).
127. See 18 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1998).
128. See 18 U.S.C. § 342 (1998).
129. See 18 U.S.C. § 501 (1998).
130. See 18 U.S.C. § 511 (1998).
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felonies. One doubts that any of these are "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors." Thus, not only are some, perhaps many, indictable crimes
not impeachable, but there is no pre-existing division in the criminal law
itself, such as that between felonies and misdemeanors, which will reliably
distinguish impeachable from non-impeachable crimes.
Still, if not all crimes or even all felonies are "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors," does not the President's unique status broaden the
category of criminal violations that ought to be grounds for impeachment?
Article II of the Constitution vests the executive power of the United States
government in the President. Section 3 of the same Article commands that
the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," and
Section 1 of that Article prescribes an oath of office in which the President
must swear that he will "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of
the United States." It can be argued that the President's role as Chief
Executive imposes a special obligation of scrupulous adherence to the
law,' 3 ' and thus that the failure to remove a presidential law breaker from
office so endangers the rule of law that the remedy of impeachment ought
to be liberally invoked whenever a President commits a significant legal
infraction. 132 Such an argument is subject to several powerful criticisms.
First, impeachment is not the only remedy the law provides against a
President who breaks it. Alexander Hamilton said of those who are
actually impeached, "After having been sentenced to a perpetual ostracism
from the esteem and confidence and honors and emoluments of his country,
he will still be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course
of law." 133 The same holds true for those who commit crimes, but are not
removed from office on that account. In other words, a refusal to impeach
does not mean a refusal to punish. If a President commits crimes for which
131. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 93-1305, at 356 (concurring views of Congressman Hamilton Fish,
Jr.) ("At the very least [the President] is bound not to violate the law; not to order others to violate the
law; and not to participate in the concealment of evidence respecting violations of law of which he is
made aware.").
132. See Testimony of Impeachment Trial of President William Jefferson Clinton, 106th Cong.
(1999) (closing remarks of Rep. Henry Hyde, Chair of the House Judiciary Committee) ("The rule of
law is what stands between all of us and the arbitrary exercise of power by the state.").
133. TIE FEDERAUST No. 65, at 332-33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books ed. 1992).
While one could argue that criminal conduct by public officials is particularly troubling and thus
deserving of a harsher treatment than the same conduct by a private citizen, such an argument supports
having tougher criminal sentences, not a separate proceeding.
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he is not impeached, nothing bars his prosecution for those offenses once
he leaves office.1
34
Second, the contention that the President's special Article II obligation
to uphold the law authorizes his impeachment for virtually all serious
criminal infractions is at odds with the designedly restrictive scope of the
Constitution's impeachment clauses. In effect, the proponents of this view
are arguing that the President's constitutional role should render him liable
to impeachment for more kinds and degrees of crime than any other federal
officer. But as discussed above, the Framers adopted the "Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" formula precisely in
order to limit the occasions on which a President might be removed.
135
There is no inconsistency in the fact that the Constitution imposes on
the President an obligation of scrupulous adherence to law and
simultaneously permits his impeachment and removal from office only for
great infractions which constitute a limited subset of the crimes for which
Presidents and paupers alike may be prosecuted and imprisoned. The
Framers were sophisticated political architects who counted on more than
the single and supremely disruptive mechanism of impeachment to regulate
presidential behavior. They assumed that the primary check on presidential
excesses would be the limited tenure of the post and the power of the
electorate to turn Presidents out of office for misbehavior. For criminal
transgressions both great and small, they expressly contemplated the
possibility of ordinary criminal prosecution of Presidents.
The view that only a restricted class of grave crimes warrants removal
of a President was manifest in several aspects of the impeachment
proceedings against President Nixon. The most obvious of these was the
Judiciary Committee's refusal to impeach the President on the basis of
substantial allegations of income tax evasion, 136 a refusal which contrasts
sharply with congressional readiness both before and after 1974 to impeach
federal judges on precisely the same ground.' 37 The rejection of the Nixon
impeachment article regarding personal tax evasion may, of course, be
134. Indeed, there is a body of opinion that a President may be indicted while in office. See, e.g.,
Eric M. Freedman, The Law As King and the King As Law: Is a President Immune from Criminal
Prosecution Before Impeachment?, 20 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 7 (1992).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 12-22.
136. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1305, at 220. The rejected article of impeachment against President
Nixon charging tax evasion also alleged that the President improperly received government money to
improve his private estates at San Clemente, California, and Key Biscayne, Florida. This charge was
rejected together with the tax allegation. See id.
137. See infra text accompanying notes 225 & 229, describing the impeachments of Judge
Halstead Ritter in 1936 and Judge Harry Claiborne in 1986, both for income tax evasion.
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explainable as a tactical choice by those favoring the President's removal to
focus on the more serious and more "political" first three articles, rather
than as a judgment that presidential tax evasion is per se not an
impeachable offense. However, it is interesting to observe that the
minority report, authored by ten dissenting Republican members of the
Committee, unequivocally endorsed the view that even proof of multiple
crimes by a President acting in concert with his subordinates would not
necessarily compel impeachment. The minority wrote of the second article
of impeachment that "isolated instances of unlawful conduct by
presidential aides and subordinates," even with "varying degrees of direct
personal knowledge or involvement of the President in these respective
illegal episodes," were insufficient to warrant impeachment and removal of
President Nixon, "or any President."' s
A President's obligation to faithfully execute the laws is certainly
relevant to the question of defining impeachable offenses. However, this
presidential obligation provides no panacea to the definitional problem.
D. DISTINGUISHING IMPEACHABLE CRIMES FROM NON-IMPEACHABLE
CRIMES
1. Towards a Working Definition of an Impeachable Crime
In the end, neither the Constitution, the Framers, the precedents, nor
the commentators can tell us exactly what differentiates statutory crimes
for which a President should be impeached from those for which he should
not. However, careful study of all these sources viewed in the light of
reason and common sense suggests certain tentative conclusions:
a. The relationship between moral gravity and political character: It
is tempting to assert categorically that only those crimes that relate to an
official's public duties are impeachable. This was certainly the view of
some noted commentators in the first half of the Nineteenth Century, 139 and
a number of prominent constitutional scholars took this stance during the
138. H.R. REP. No. 93-1305, at 360.
139. See, e.g., WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 210-19
(2d ed. 1829) (excerpted in 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 169 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner,
eds. 1987)) ("In general those offences which may be committed equally by a private person as a public
officer, are not the subjects of impeachment. Murder, burglary, robbery, and indeed all offences not
immediately connected with office, except the two expressly mentioned, are left to the ordinary course
of judicial proceeding .... ).
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Clinton impeachment proceedings. 140  However, while the relationship of
the misconduct to the official's public duties is one of the most important
considerations and this absolutist position has the merit of simplicity, it is
very difficult to maintain, either as a matter of original intent, political
theory, or practical politics.
When pressed on the point, almost all modem commentators concede
that at least a few really nasty private crimes would certainly result in
impeachment. For example, Professor Cass Sunstein told the House
Judiciary Committee during the Clinton inquiry:
The basic point of the impeachment provision is to allow the House of
Representatives to impeach the President of the United States for
egregious misconduct that amounts to the abusive misuse of the authority
of his office. This principle does not exclude the possibility that a
President would be impeachable for an extremely heinous "private'
crime, such as murder or rape. But it suggests that outside of such
extraordinary (and unprecedented and most unlikely) cases,
impeachment is unacceptable. 1
41
Professor Sunstein went on to argue that the criminal allegations
against President Clinton-perjury and obstruction of justice as part of an
effort to cover up an illicit sexual affair-are not impeachable because the
subject matter of the cover-up was private conduct unrelated to the office
of the presidency and because the allegations do not fall into the narrow
category of "extremely heinous" impeachable private crimes. 142
Noticeably, this argument leaps nimbly over the question of why the
allegations against President Clinton were not sufficiently heinous to merit
impeachment.
The key to unraveling Sunstein's argument is his characterization of
impeachable private crimes as particularly "heinous." This may be an
accurate characterization, but it fails to explain why even heinous crimes
should merit impeachment if "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" embrace
only abuses of office. The answer is surely that certain kinds of egregious
140. For example, a group of 400 historians styling themselves "Historians In Defense of the
Constitution" signed a letter asserting that the Constitution authorizes presidential impeachment only
"for high crimes and misdemeanors in the exercise of executive power." Impeachment Background,
supra note 11, at 334 (1998) (statement of Historians in Defense of the Constitution). Similarly, more
than 300 law professors wrote the Speaker of the House and argued that, while private crimes might in
some circumstances merit impeachment, the crimes alleged against President Clinton were not
impeachable because they did not involve the "grossly derelict exercise of official authority." Id. at
375-76 (letter to Newt Gingrich, et al.).
141. Id. at 89 (statement of Cass R. Sunstein).
142. See id. at 90.
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behavior, whether connected to the office or not, strip the President of
legitimacy and render the President unfit in the eyes of the country to hold
office. Murder and rape are easy exemplars of this truth, but contrary to
Professor Sunstein's suggestion, the principle extends beyond such extreme
cases. Democratic leadership requires more than an electoral majority and
a four-year lease on the White House. Presidential leadership depends in
significant part on the exercise of moral authority, some inherent in the
office of the presidency and some deriving from the character of its
occupant. Presidential leadership also requires integrity, at least insofar as
both a President's friends and foes must have reasonable confidence that, at
least most of the time, the President speaks the truth and keeps promises.
Furthermore, presidential leadership demands at least some modicum of
virtue, at least to the degree that the President must not violate the basic
social norms embodied in the law's proscriptions against very serious
criminal offenses. Without some indefinable minimum of these
characteristics of moral authority, integrity, and personal virtue, a President
cannot govern.
We do not suggest that the President must be the spotless High Priest
of the nation's civic religion who must be cast down for any sin. Nor do
we suggest, in the maudlin terms employed by the House managers in the
Clinton impeachment, that a President must be removed whenever he
becomes a bad role model for "the kids." 143  Rather, we endorse the
practical view that "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" includes not only
crimes that are "political" in nature, but also crimes that are "political" in
effect. While the principal focus of the Constitution's impeachment clauses
is certainly on offenses involving serious abuses of the powers of office, a
President may also be impeached for crimes which make it unbearably
difficult for the President to perform the duties of his necessarily political
office.
Accordingly, we believe that what makes a crime a "high Crime or
Misdemeanor," and therefore a proper basis for impeachment is a
combination of moral gravity and political character which is admittedly
difficult to define with precision. Some particularly morally reprehensible
crimes, including but not limited to the oft-cited examples of premeditated
murder and forcible rape, would certainly require impeachment of the
President even if committed for entirely private motives in circumstances
143. See 145 CoNG. REc. S948 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1999) (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde,
Chairman of the House Judiciary Comm.).
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wholly unconnected with the Office of the President. 144 On the other hand,
the more political the crime and the more it involves abuse of the
president's official position or subversion of the proper functions of the
other branches of government, the less significant will be its moral
depravity. A President who used illegal wiretaps to obtain information
with which to blackmail a Congressman into voting for flood and famine
relief would be no less impeachable because his motives were good. Such
conduct imperils honest constitutional government.
Crimes which are both morally reprehensible and intimately related to
the presidential office are the most obviously impeachable (for example,
murder of a political rival, or selling military secrets to known terrorists).
Beyond such extreme examples, however, the more reprehensible the
crime, the more relaxed will be the required nexus to the President's
official duties. The more direct the connection between the crime and the
President's constitutional functions, the lower the required level of
heinousness.
b. The severity of the crime in the eyes of the criminal law: Although
not all crimes-not even all felonies-are impeachable "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors," the severity of the crime in the eyes of the criminal law is
certainly relevant. Felonies are more serious than misdemeanors. Within
the broad class of felonies, Congress has expressed a rough view of the
relative seriousness of different felony offenses by assigning different
levels of punishment.145 On balance, a crime for which the criminal law
prescribes a sentence of ten years is probably more serious than an offense
where the likely punishment is six months. Such distinctions are certainly
relevant to an impeachment inquiry.
c. The relative importance of the elements of a crime and the
circumstances under which it was committed: Any consideration of
whether allegedly criminal presidential conduct is also an impeachable
"high Crime or Misdemeanor" should not be limited to an abstract
assessment of the statutory elements of the crime, but must also take
account of the particular circumstances of the case. For example, in the
144. As Professor Sean Wilentz has noted, however, the only pertinent historical case seems to
point in the other direction. Aaron Burr killed Alexander Hamilton in a duel, was indicted in New
Jersey for murder, but was not impeached. See Statement of Sean Wilentz, supra note 22, at 27 n.4.
145. The real severity ranking of federal offenses may not always be apparent from looking at the
statutory maximum sentences. A better gauge will often be found in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
For an explanation of the operation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see Frank 0. Bowman, III,
The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L.R. 679, 692-704.
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State of Washington, wrongfully appropriating a $1500 watch misdelivered
in the mail is the same statutory crime, first degree theft, as embezzling
$1.5 million from a trust fund for widows and orphans. 146 It will often be
the circumstances rather than the label of the crime that determine its true
seriousness.
d. Perjury and obstruction of justice: Perjury and obstruction of
justice are serious felonies that strike at the heart of the judicial process. In
the impeachment setting, an allegation that a President lied under oath or
sought to induce others to do so must be viewed with the utmost
seriousness. As with any other crime, however, the label is not necessarily
determinative of the true seriousness of the crime or of the weight to be
accorded the crime in the impeachment calculus. Put plainly, some
perjuries and obstructions are certainly "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors,"' 47 while other perjuries and obstructions may not rise to
that terrible level. Both the general principles concerning the impeachment
clauses discussed at length above and several specific impeachment
precedents provide some guidance in analyzing particular cases.
First, consistent with the principle that "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors" are political crimes, the founding generation explicitly
contemplated that a President who lied directly to Congress about matters
relating to his office, whether under oath or not, could be impeached.
Recall the declaration of James Iredell, one of the first Supreme Court
Justices, that, "The President must certainly be punishable for giving false
information to the Senate.'
148
146. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.56.020(l)(a), (c) & 9A.56.030(l)(a) (West 1998).
147. See Impeachment Inquiry, supra note 22, at 34-37 (statement of Professor Gary L.
McDowell). Professor McDowell argues at length that perjury would plainly have been understood by
the Framers to be a "high crime or misdemeanor" for impeachment purposes. While agreeing that
perjury may sometimes be an impeachable offense, we find Professor McDowell's argument from
original intent unconvincing. He contends that "high crimes and misdemeanors" was, in effect, a legal
term of art drawn from English impeachment cases which the Framers adopted because it had a well-
understood, or at least readily ascertainable, meaning to be found in English common law. See id. at
32-34. He then refers to numerous English common law authorities which describe perjury as a serious
offense. See id. at 34-37. The difficulty with McDowell's argument is that none of the English
authorities on perjury whom he cites concern either impeachment in general or the meaning of "high
crimes and misdemeanors" in particular, they really say nothing more than that perjury was a common
law crime prosecutable in the ordinary criminal courts. McDowell cites no English or early American
case or legal commentator holding that perjury was an impeachable offense at common law. Indeed,
McDowell would seem to be defeated by his own premises: If at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution "high crimes and misdemeanors" had a well-understood meaning rooted in English
impeachment cases, the absence of any instance of an English or pre-Revolutionary American
impeachment for perjury would seem to exclude, rather than include, perjury as an impeachable
offense.
148. DEBATEs, supra note 44, at 127.
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Second, there is ample precedent for removing officials from office
for perjury or obstruction. President Richard Nixon was impeached for
obstruction of justice, and within the last decade two federal judges, Alcee
Hastings and Walter Nixon, were impeached and removed from office for
perjury.149  A notable feature of these impeachments was that they all
involved lies about underlying conduct that was itself either criminal or
involved a corrupt misuse of office. President Nixon's case is well known.
Judge Alcee Hastings was impeached and convicted for lying at his
criminal trial about his participation in a conspiracy to solicit a bribe.' 50
Judge Walter Nixon was impeached and convicted for lying to a grand jury
about his connection to the father of an accused drug smuggler and for
attempting to influence the outcome of the son's case.' 51
There is no clear guidance in the constitutional text, the debates of the
Founders, or prior impeachment precedents regarding allegations of perjury
or obstruction that do not concern lies told in the President's official
capacity or in an effort to conceal conduct that would itself be a crime.
However, in assessing the seriousness of any particular allegation of
presidential perjury, it may be important to consider the treatment of
similar cases in the ordinary criminal process. The Clinton impeachment
suggests at least two possible grounds for categorizing perjury cases-the
forum in which the perjury occurred and the subject about which the lie
was told.
i. The forum of the lie: Perjury before federal grand juries and in
federal criminal trials is prosecuted with reasonable frequency, suggesting
that lies in these settings are considered particularly egregious. On the
other hand, perjury committed in civil cases is very rarely prosecuted in
federal courts. 152 Even more rare is a prosecution for perjury or obstruction
149. See infra text accompanying notes 233-36.
150. See infra text accompanying notes 233-34.
151. See infra text accompanying notes 236-37.
152. This point was made repeatedly during the Clinton impeachment proceedings by a parade of
Democratic and Republican ex-prosecutors who testified before the House Judiciary Committee. See,
e.g., Impeachment Inquiry, supra note 22, at 289 (statement of Thomas P. Sullivan, former U.S.
Attorney, Northern District of Illinois) ("It is rare that federal criminal process is used with respect to
allegations of perjury or obstruction in civil matters."); Statement of Richard J. Davis, former Assistant
Treasury Secretary for Enforcement and Operations and Task Force Leader in Watergate Special
Prosecution Force, id. at 304 ("Prosecutions of individuals for lying in civil depositions is extremely
rare. While in isolated instances such cases have been brought, criminal prosecutions have generally
not been used to police veracity in the civil justice system"); Statement of Edward S.G. Dennis, former
Department of Justice official, id. at 316 ("In my experience, perjury or obstruction of justice
prosecutions of parties in private civil litigation are rare"); Professor Ronald K. Noble, former Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, id. at 325 ("As a general matter, federal prosecutors are not asked to bring
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of justice arising from a civil case to which the federal government is not
itself a party.' 53
The language of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512, 1621, and 1623 sweeps broadly
enough to embrace false swearing in, and obstruction of, federal civil
actions to which the federal government is not a party. The Sixth Circuit
has observed that "[t]he possibility of a perjury prosecution exists
whenever an individual takes an oath, in a civil or criminal matter, where
the law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered .... ,,1
Cases charging perjury or obstruction in connection with a purely private
civil action have been brought in federal court. Nonetheless, as the
Eleventh Circuit noted, the "vast majority of convictions under 18 U.S.C. §
1621 may involve perjury in a criminal proceeding ... ." Indeed, a
search of all reported federal cases since 1944 revealed seventeen
prosecutions for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512, 1621, or 1623 arising out
of a civil action to which the United States, or some agency thereof, was
not a party. 156 If one assumes that the seventeen cases located by search of
prior appellate case law represent only one-sixth of the actual total of such
cases filed, and therefore that roughly one hundred such cases have been
brought since 1944, the result would nonetheless be that a case of perjury
federal criminal charges against individuals who allegedly peijure themselves in connection with civil
lawsuits."). No present or former federal prosecutor testified to the contrary.
153. See, e.g., id. at 289 (statement of Thomas P. Sullivan) ("Federal prosecutors do not use the
criminal process in connection with civil litigation involving private parties.").
154. In re Morganroth, 718 F.2d 161. 166(6th Cir. 1983).
155. United States v. Holland, 22 F.3d 1040, 1047 (1 lth Cir. 1994). In fairness, it should be noted
that the Holland court made this observation in the course of rejecting the district court's grant of a
downward departure based on the ground that the perjury at issue in the case occurred in n civil
proceeding. The civil case in question was an effort by Morris Dees of the Southern Poverty Law
Center to collect a judgment obtained against the defendant for violating the civil rights of various
persons while acting as leader of the Ku Klux Klan.
156. Although the electronic search that produced this result was designed to discover every
perjury or obstruction case reported in the past half century arising from a civil action to which the U.S.
was not a party, we have no doubt that some such cases slipped through the search net. Nonetheless,
we suggest that no search, no matter how exhaustive, will discover a significantly larger group of such
cases. The cases identified were: Holland, 22 F.3d 1040; United States v. McAfee, 8 F.3d 1010 (5th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992); Morales v. United States, No. 92-
1157, 1992 WL 245718 (1st Cir. Oct. 1, 1992) (unpublished); United States v. Maddox, Nos. 91-5142,
91-5185, 1991 WL 164318 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 1991) (unpublished); United States v. Clark, 918 F.2d
843 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Jonnet, 762
F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Coven, 662 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v.
Comiskey, 460 F.2d 1293 (7th Cir. 1972); Brightman v. United States, 386 F.2d 695 (Ist Cir. 1967);
United States v. Lester, 248 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1957); Roberts v. United States, 239 F.2d 467 (9th Cir.
1956); Schiffhian v. Postmaster of Philadelphia, Nos. Civ.A. 95-5363, Civ.A. 95-6846, 1997 WL
602786 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 1997) (unpublished); United States v. Ashley, 905 F. Supp. 1146 (E.D.N.Y.
1995); United States v. Dell, 736 F. Supp. 186 (N.D. III. 1990); United States v. Taylor, 693 F. Supp.
828 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
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or obstruction in a case involving only private parties is brought by any
given U.S. Attorney's Office, on average, once every half century. 157
Among the seventeen cases identified above, the majority were plainly
brought to vindicate a strong, and easily ascertainable, federal interest.
158
The principle that crimes are more impeachable the more closely they
relate to the functions of the President's office and to subversion of the
interests of the national government suggests that a lie told in a private civil
action to which the government is not a party is less constitutionally
significant than a lie directly affecting the President's office and the
national interest. This view seems to have carried the day, or at least to
have contributed to the outcome, in the Clinton case. Although the House
Judiciary Committee reported out an article of impeachment charging that
President Clinton committed peijury in the Paula Jones civil lawsuit, the
full House of Representatives voted against including this article in the
final Bill of Impeachment.
159
ii. The subject matter of the lie: The subject matter of the lie also
makes a difference. President Clinton's defenders suggested that lying
about consensual sexual relations, whether in a civil lawsuit or in the grand
jury is not a proper ground for impeachment, regardless of whether it may
technically constitute a crime. Some commentators went so far as to
157. There are 93 United States Attorney's Offices. For a complete listing, see FEDERAL STAFF
DIREcTORY 620-24 (Summer 1999).
158. See, e.g., Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786 (witness tampering and perjury were part of scheme to
steal tribal funds in Indian country); Reed, 773 F.2d 477 (perjury part of securities fraud scheme
criminally prosecuted by U.S.); Ashley, 905 F. Supp. 1146 (perjury part of scheme to defraud Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corp.); Coven, 662 F.2d 162 and Dell, 736 F. Supp. 186 (obstruction, false
statements, and perjury part of fraud scheme criminally prosecuted by U.S.); Comiskey, 460 F.2d 1293
(case referred directly to U.S. Attorney by U.S. District Judge who presided over civil case); Clark, 918
F.2d 843 (perjury involved case concerning complaint to EEOC); Holland, 22 F.3d 1040 (Southern
Poverty Law Center acting as something approximating a government surrogate in long-rnnning federal
fight against bigotry and violence of the KKK).
159. See 144 CoNG. REC. H12041 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1998) (on the adoption of Art. II: yeas 205,
nays 229, not voting 1). Of course, as with so many other aspects of the Clinton case, the House vote
on proposed Article 2 is subject to varying interpretations. On the one hand, a dispassionate view of the
Jones deposition leads inescapably to the conclusion that the President lied repeatedly about various
aspects of his connection with a White House intern. See Presentations by Investigative Counsel,
Impeachment Inquiry Pursuant to H.R. 581, 105th Cong. 103-140 (Dec. 10, 1998) (statement of David
Schippers, majority counsel in House Judiciary Comm.). On the other hand, colorable legal arguments
were pressed vigorously by the President's defenders that the President's statements in the deposition,
even if untrue, were not material to the Jones proceeding and thus could not constitute perjury. Id. at
39-42 (statement of Abbe Lowell, minority counsel in House Judiciary Comm.). Thus, some
congressmen who voted against Article 2 may, as we suggest, have done so because they thought lying
in a civil deposition (or at least lying in a civil deposition about consensual sex) is not impeachable,
while others may have voted the same way because they believed the lies legally immaterial, and thus
not criminal, and thus not impeachable.
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suggest that a "gentleman" is honor-bound to lie about extra-marital sex. 160
Even presidential supporters who were not willing to go quite that far
argued that lies about sex are unlikely to be impeachable because such lies
ordinarily concern private conduct unrelated to public duties, because they
are commonly told, and because they are uncommonly prosecuted. In the
Clinton case, the Republican majority of the House Judiciary Committee
attempted to refute at least the last of these contentions by calling as
witnesses two persons who had actually been convicted and sentenced to
prison for lying under oath about sexual matters. 161 Whatever else one may
say of these witnesses, the very rarity of their cases would seem to have
undermined the point their Committee sponsors were trying to make.
E. DESCRIBING A CATEGORY OF IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES FOR WHICH
THE HOUSE SHOULD NONETHELESS NOT IMPEACH AND THE SENATE NOT
REMOVE A PRESIDENT
One of the conceptual difficulties in debates over impeachment flows
from the fact that the constitutional language seems imperative. Article II
says that the President "shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for
and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors." Read closely, however, the Constitution does not say that
Congress must impeach if a President commits high crimes or
misdemeanors; it says only that the President must be removed if
impeached and convicted.' 62 This aspect of the impeachment process is
captured better in the common term "impeachable offense" than in the
constitutional language itself. An "impeachable offense" is one for which,
consistent with the Constitution, the legislature could, but need not,
impeach and remove an officeholder. We think that there is indeed a class
of such offenses. The difficulty is to articulate a sensible and systematic
way of deciding which cases merit removal and which do not.
1. The Model of Prosecutorial Discretion
A useful model for a Congress deciding whether an impeachable
offense warrants presidential removal is the decisional process by which a
public prosecutor decides which of many technically prosecutable offenses
and offenders merit the imposition of the moral opprobrium and harsh
160. See, e.g., Impeachment Background, supra note 11, at 101 (statement of Arthur Schlesinger)
("[o]nly a cad tells the truth about his love affairs").
161. See Consequences of Perjury, supra note 10, at 6-11 (statements of Pam Parsons and Barbara
Battalino).
162. As to whether conviction requires removal, see infra note 181.
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punishments of the criminal law. In such a process, the decisionmaker
must consider: (1) what are the provable facts; (2) whether the facts
establish a violation of the law; (3) whether prosecution promotes or
disserves the goals of criminal law; and more broadly, (4) whether the
interests of society are best served by proceeding or exercising restraint.
In the case of impeachment, two of the four conventionally articulated
rationales for criminal prosecution and punishment-retribution,
rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation-are absent.' 63 The goal of
impeachment is neither retribution against, nor rehabilitation of, the official
who commits an offense.' 64 However, the impeachment remedy certainly
is designed to deter would-be presidential miscreants from abusing their
office. 165 Likewise, and perhaps more importantly, impeachment serves a
function much akin to "incapacitation" in criminal theory-it is a remedy
designed to put the offender in a place where the offender can do no more
harm. For the ordinary felon, incapacitation is attained by imprisonment;
in cases of presidential impeachment, Congress incapacitates by removal
from office. A Congress applying the "prosecutorial discretion" model of
impeachment analysis would first ascertain the facts regarding the
President's conduct, then decide whether the conduct constituted a "high
Crime or Misdemeanor" under the Constitution, and finally determine
whether to exercise its discretion to impeach or forebear from
impeachment. Carrying the analogy to prosecutorial discretion a step
further, a Congress considering impeachment of a President whose conduct
has reached the impeachable threshold might find it useful to consider:
a) whether impeachment and removal for the particular conduct at
issue is necessary to deter future Presidents from engaging in similar
conduct;
163. For a general account of the conventional justifications of criminal punishment, see ANDREW
VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 9-55 (1976). See also Bowman, supra
note 145, at 684-96 (discussing the traditional justifications for punishment in connection with the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
164. See STORY, supra note 11, § 801 ("an impeachment is a proceeding of a purely political
nature. It is not so much designed to punish an offender, as to secure the state against gross official
misdemeanors. It touches neither his person nor his property, but simply divests him of his political
capacity.")
165. Impeachment achieves general, rather than specific, deterrence. Specific deterrence is absent
because once a President is impeached and removed, the President is unable to commit-not dissuaded
from committing-more public transgressions that Congress wishes to deter. Indeed, the law would
prevent the President's return to any federal office if the Senate imposed the additional penalty of
disqualification, and even if it did not, practical politics would almost certainly prevent re-election.
Those actually deterred from future wrongdoing in office are the impeached President's successors.
1999] 1559
HeinOnline  -- 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1559 1998-1999
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
b) whether impeachment and removal for such conduct might deter
others prone to engage in such conduct from seeking the Presidency in the
first place, and whether the country is better off if such persons are deterred
from running;
c) whether "incapacitation" of the President under scrutiny is
necessary for the immediate protection of the Republic; that is, whether
removal before the natural expiration of the presidential term is necessary
in order to prevent more wrongdoing of a similar character; and
d) most importantly, whether the impeachment and removal of this
President on these grounds promotes or disserves the country over the long
term.
2. Applying the Model to the Clinton Case
It is possible to explain the result of the Clinton impeachment
primarily in terms of the first two stages of prosecutorial discretion
analysis. That is, one can conclude that the impeachment effort failed
because of lingering doubts about the facts of the case or because not
enough legislators were convinced that the charges met the constitutional
standard of "high Crimes or Misdemeanors." Indeed, the House's refusal
to accept two articles of impeachment recommended by the Judiciary
Committee-perjury in the Paula Jones lawsuit and abuse of power-
seems to have been based on this kind of analysis, 166 as does the Senate's
acquittal on the obstruction of justice charge. 167
166. With regard to the charge of pejury in the deposition, given that the Judge in the case
recently held President Clinton in contempt for his lack of honesty, see Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d
1118 (E.D. Ark. 1999), we take as a given that the President lied in the Paula Jones civil deposition.
Indeed, the facts of this charge were never truly an issue. It seems, therefore, that the refusal of the full
House to impeach on this ground is most readily explained as a judgment that the lies were not "high
Crimes or Misdemeanors" either because no lie about sex in a private civil lawsuit could ever be
impeachable, or because these lies concerned issues so peripheral to this lawsuit-let alone to the
President's official duties-that the President's falsehoods were either legally immaterial or nearly so.
With regard to proposed Article 4, which charged President Clinton with abuse of power for
providing incomplete, misleading, or false answers to interrogatories from the Judiciary Committee,
there was a real factual issue about whether the responses were false and misleading, or merely
permissibly narrow and not forthcoming. Moreover, even if one concluded that the answers were
impermissibly narrow or downright deceptive, there was a genuine issue about whether slippery
responses to Congress, as opposed to outright defiance, constitute a "high Crime or Misdemeanor,"
167. The obstruction article passed by the House, but rejected by the Senate, included allegations
that the President concealed evidence and encouraged witnesses to commit perjury. These were
probably the most serious charges against the President, and although they related to the President's
office only tangentially, it is difficult to imagine that a majority of Senators concluded that, if proven,
they did not rise to the level of an impeachable offense. However, the evidence in support of these
allegations was weak. Against the unequivocal denial of the President and those he allegedly
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However, Clinton's acquittal may also be an example of the exercise
of discretion by the Senate. Some senators may well have believed that the
President's conduct met the minimum constitutional threshold for
impeachment, but have employed something akin to the deterrence and
incapacitation rationales enunciated above. That is, particularly in
reference to the charge of perjury before the grand jury, they may have
concluded that the House managers failed to show either that conviction
was necessary to prevent this President, or deter future presidents, from
engaging in similar behavior, or that the country either required or desired
protection from further misdeeds by President Clinton through his
immediate ouster from the presidency.1
68
As influential as these considerations may have been, we strongly
suspect that President Clinton would have been removed from office had it
not been for another factor bearing on the exercise of congressional
discretion: a powerful national consensus opposing impeachment which
took into account not only the gravity of the statutory violations and the
subject matter of the lies and obstructive behavior, but the procedural
context in which the occasions for lying and obstruction arose. While the
adultery at the heart of the scandal was the President's failing alone, an
original sin without which nothing that happened thereafter could have
happened, by contrast, the crimes for which he faced impeachment were
the lies and evasions about the sin. Those crimes were, at least arguably,
manufactured for the purpose of destroying the President. These crimes of
influenced to lie or conceal evidence, the prosecution could produce only hearsay testimony and
circumstantial inferences from phone records and visitors logs. Thus, the Senate's action is more
probably attributable to doubts about whether the allegations were sufficiently proven.
168. Although the evidence may be less compelling on this charge than with respect to the charge
of perjury in the deposition, it seems likely that the President took some liberties with the truth in his
grand jury testimony. Moreover, the difference in setting between the civil deposition and the grand
jury may explain the decision of the full House to impeach the President for perjurious grand jury
testimony, but not for perjury in the Jones deposition. The shift in setting had two likely effects on the
thinking of wavering House members. First, as noted above, grand jury perjury is regularly prosecuted
and universally accepted as a serious criminal offense. See supra text accompanying note 152. Second,
while the President could plausibly claim that his false answers in the Jones deposition were not legally
material to the plaintiff's civil rights claim, they were certainly material, in the sense of being relevant,
to the focus of the Independent Counsel's criminal investigation. Thus, in the House a majority of
Members was convinced that the facts proved commission of a crime which was sufficiently grave to be
both impeachable and worthy of a vote for removal.
In the Senate, Clinton's lawyers argued that even if the President's testimony was not entirely
candid or forthcoming about the details of his conduct, the essence of his testimony-confessing an
"inappropriate" relationship of a sexual character-was truthful. Perhaps, then, the failure of this article
in the Senate is attributable to a determination by many senators that any untrue portions of the
President's testimony were "immaterial" in the sense of being insubstantial. More likely, though, the
Senate's failure to convict on this article is explained as an exercise of discretion.
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falsehood were not "manufactured" in the sense that the President did not
commit them. Rather, they were manufactured in the sense that once
evidence of the original sin began to surface, the President's opponents
persistently sought to place him in situations where either a lie or the truth
would be used as a political weapon against him.
It is not the purpose of this Article to explore the issue of the propriety
of the conduct of the Independent Counsel, or the particulars of the
interaction between the Office of Independent Counsel and the private
lawyers working on the Jones civil lawsuit. The issue here is the
relationship of the emergent culture of politics by investigation to the
constitutional process of impeachment. A confluence of circumstances has
created an engine for the destruction of public men and women. It has
grown slowly and its many components, often beneficial in themselves,
have fallen together largely by accident. Congress has passed an ever more
comprehensive set of laws that make virtually every sort of unpleasant,
unethical, or merely boorish behavior a legal cause of action. The courts
and Congress have approved rules of civil discovery that allow intrusive
questioning into the most collateral matters. We have laws against perjury
and false statement that are seldom used, but always available. We have-
or at least had-an independent counsel statute that confers on unelected
officials who belong to none of the three constitutional branches of
government the power to pursue our highest public officers for any real or
suspected transgression of the sprawling federal criminal code. We have
well-funded advocacy groups at both extremes of the political spectrum
who are beyond political control and who will use any available legal or
public relations tool to demonize and destroy those they perceive to be their
enemies.
In combination, these many apparently unrelated developments permit
the extremists of both parties to pull down their opponents. The strategy is
plain. Find a mistake or personal weakness. If it is already criminal, call
for an independent counsel. If not criminal yet, file a civil lawsuit or start a
congressional investigation. If no direct evidence of criminality is
unearthed, get the target under oath. Force the victim to admit
indiscretions that will embarrass and potentially bring political ruin, or to
lie and commit perjury.
We suspect that the real question on which the Clinton impeachment
turned was whether the constitutional remedy of impeachment was to
become merely another weapon in the arsenal of practitioners of the
politics of personal destruction. The most persuasive advocates for
President Clinton's removal argued with sincerity and passion that
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adherence to the rule of law requires a President to conform to the law's
rules.169 To give them their due, while the President's oath to see that the
laws be faithfully executed may not translate every presidential violation of
a criminal code into an impeachable offense, neither is the oath merely a
form of words. A president's oath of office imposes a special trust.
Violation of that trust is undeniably germane to the impeachment calculus.
The House Managers prosecuting President Clinton countered the
argument that impeachment is principally directed at abuses of official
power with the persuasive contention that a pattern of conscious
lawbreaking for personal gain delegitimates a President and renders him
impeachable because it destroys his capacity to lead a free people. Had it
not been for the national revulsion against the process through which
President Clinton's disgraceful conduct was exposed, this argument might
well have carried the day.
At the core of the national consensus that saved President Clinton was
the belief that, while Presidents must obey the law, the impeachment
calculus may in the extraordinary case require a judgment about the legal
process that unearthed or even induced allegedly unlawful presidential
behavior. Impeachment is a political tool whose constitutional function is
to remove officials whose presence in office disserves the country. As a
political process, impeachment can equally aptly, and equally
constitutionally, be used as a vehicle to express disapproval of a method of
politics more destructive of the public welfare than the continuance in
office of one severely flawed individual.
IV. CONCLUSION
On August 9, 1974, Gerald Ford, the ex-congressman who sought
unsuccessfully to impeach Justice Douglas, took the oath of office as
President of the United States, replacing Richard Nixon who resigned
rather than face near-certain impeachment and removal.170 In his inaugural
address, President Ford declared, "our long national nightmare is over." 171
He was only partly right, of course. 'Watergate" as a daily drama was
169. See, e.g., Closing statement of Rep. Henry Hyde, Chair House Judiciary Comm., supra note
132:
The rule of law is the safeguard of our liberties. [It] is what allows us to live our freedoms in
ways that honor the freedom of others while strengthening the common good. The rule of law
is like a three-legged stool: one leg is the honest judge, the second leg is an ethical bar and the
third leg is an enforceable oath.
Id.
170. See WHITE, supra note 104, at 34.
171. GERALD R. FoRD, A TIME TO HEAL: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF GERALD R. FoRD 41 (1979).
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indeed over, but no event of real historical consequence ever ends crisply
like a movie or a play, with a final fadeout or the drawing of a curtain. The
fall of Richard Nixon changed the way Americans thought about politics
and government. It fueled a wave of ethics-in-government reforms,
notably including the Independent Counsel statute, many of which came
into play during the Clinton scandal. In the mythology of American
politics, Watergate transformed impeachment of the President from a
faintly disreputable constitutional museum piece into an Excalibur to be
wielded by brave legislator-statesmen against a renegade Chief Executive
who besmirched his high office.
Whether the sword of impeachment should have been unsheathed
against President Clinton is a question we leave to others. Regardless of
one's views on the outcome, the Clinton affair illuminated certain truths
about the impeachment process itself. First, the Framers of the
Constitution intended that removal of the President be difficult. They
erected two formidable barriers to impeachment and removal: first, the
textual limitation of impeachable offenses to the narrow category of "high
Crimes and Misdemeanors," and second, the procedural hurdle of votes by
a majority of the House of Representatives and two-thirds of the Senate. In
the Clinton case, the procedural barrier proved insurmountable and thus
dispositive of the controversy. Given this result, one might conclude that
Gerald Ford was right all along, that impeachable offenses are whatever
Congress says they are, 172 and that all the debate over the constitutionally
proper definition of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" (including this
Article) was and always will be a waste of time. Although there is some
undeniable force in such a view, we remain convinced that the
constitutional language matters profoundly.
In the Clinton case, for example, despite much disagreement over
important details, the universally-voiced consensus that the constitutional
impeachment threshold is "high" set the general boundaries of the field on
which the battle was fought. This consensus, drawn from constitutional
language and historical precedent, placed an immensely heavy burden of
proof on proponents of impeachment, and represented an immensely
valuable psychological bulwark for the President's defenders. Perhaps
more important still, the very debate over the constitutional standard-the
meticulous dissections of constitutional language and legislative history,
the enumeration of precedents rooted in dimly remembered controversies
from the Nation's past, and the sometimes mind-numbing disputes of
172. See 116 CONG. REC. H3113-14, supra note 1.
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scholars, journalists, and politicians-served an incommensurably valuable
function. In the course of debating the meaning of four words-"high
Crimes and Misdemeanors"--the Nation wrestled with itself over
fundamental questions about the design of the Republic: the proper
relationship between the branches of government, the nature of presidential
leadership, the connection between private morals and public duties, and
the kind of politics appropriate to healthy representative democracy. In the
course of deciding the meaning of four words, the country was able to
make some decisions about itself.
The most common post-mortem on the fall of President Nixon was
that, "The Constitution worked." The verdict of history has not yet been
written on the Clinton impeachment. If a consensus emerges that "the
Constitution worked" yet again, it will be because the impeachment clauses
of the Constitution proved supple enough to recognize a distinction
between a President who endangers the constitutional order and a system of
personalized politics every bit as dangerous to the Nation as one bad man.
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What follows is a synopsis of articles of impeachment adopted in each
of the sixteen impeachments in the nation's history, as well as the Senate's
votes on each of these articles. For quicker reference, this information is
further condensed into a chart at the end.
WILLIAM BLOUNT
United States Senator (Tenn.)
House Vote to Impeach: July 7, 1797
Articles of Impeachment Adopted: January 29, 1798
Senate Action: January 11, 1799
Article 1: In 1797, while the United States was officially neutral in the
war between Spain and Great Britain, Blount, "designing and
intending to disturb the peace and tranquility of the United
States, and to violate and infringe the neutrality thereof,"
conspired to conduct a hostile military expedition against
Spanish territory in Florida and Louisiana and to conquer
such territory for Great Britain.
Article 2: Despite a treaty between the United States and Spain by
which both nations agreed to "maintain peace and harmony
among the several Indian nations" inhabiting the Floridas,
and to restrain the Indian nations within their borders from
attacking the subjects or natives of the other, Blount
conspired to "excite the Creek and Cherokee nations of
Indians ... to commence hostilities against Spanish subjects
and territory."
Article 3: To accomplish the criminal designs described in Articles 1 &
2, Blount conspired and contrived "to alienate and divert the
confidence" of the Indian nations from Benjamin Hawkins,
the lawfully appointed federal agent for Indian affairs.
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Article 4: To accomplish the criminal designs described in Articles 1 &
2, Blount conspired and contrived to seduce James Carey, the
official federal interpreter to the Cherokee nation, from the
duty and trust of his office and to engage him to assist in the
promotion and execution of Blount's criminal designs.
Article 5: To accomplish the criminal designs described in Articles 1 &
2, Blount conspired and contrived to diminish and impair the
confidence of the Cherokee nation in the government of the
United States, and to foment discontent and disaffection
between them, in relation to treaties by which the two agreed
to ascertain and mark a boundary line between them. 173
On July 8, 1797, after receiving a message from President Adams
describing Senator Blount's conduct, the Senate expelled him by a vote of
25-1.174 Although the House had voted the previous day to impeach
Senator Blount, it did not adopt the articles of impeachment necessary to
pursue the matter until the following year. The Senate ultimately dismissed
the case after it ruled by a vote of 14-11 that a Senator was not a civil
officer subject to impeachment.175
JOHN PICKERING
Judge for the District of New Hampshire
House Vote to Impeach: March 2, 1803
Articles of Impeachment Adopted: December 30, 1803
Senate Action: March 12, 1804
Article 1: Pickering, with the intent to evade a federal law, ordered the
ship Eliza, its contents, and some cables to be delivered to a
claimant of such property despite the claimant's failure to
provide a certificate that the applicable tonnage duties had
been paid.
Article 2: Pickering, with the intent to defeat the just claims of the
United States, refused to hear testimony of witnesses offered
to show that the ship Eliza and its contents were properly
173. HOUSE COmiM. ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT: SELECTED MATERIALS, H.R. Doc. 93-7,
at 126-28 (1973) (hereinafter IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS).
174. See 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 43-44 (1797). See also IMPEACHiMENT PROCEDURE, supra note 31,
at 343-47.
175. See id. at 378.
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forfeited to the United States, and instead ordered the
property returned to the private claimant.
Article 3: Pickering, "disregarding the authority of the laws and
wickedly meaning and intending to injure the revenues of the
United States and thereby impair their public credit" refused
to allow an appeal of his ruling regarding ownership of the
ship Eliza and its contents.
Article 4: Pickering appeared on the bench "in a state of total
intoxication, produced by the free and intemperate use of
intoxicating liquors," and "in a most profane and indecent
manner, [did] invoke the name of the Supreme Being, to the
evil example of the good citizens of the United States."'176
Judge Pickering did not appear at the impeachment trial, but his son
sent a letter to the Senate suggesting and offering to prove that the Judge
was insane at the time of the Eliza case and remained so. 177  After the
Senate received evidence as to both guilt and insanity, 178 it voted on the
articles of impeachment. Five senators "retired from the court" and refused
to vote on the articles because they believed the form of the question posed
to be an unfair one, because it precluded them from expressing judgment
on what they considered the most important issues: Judge Pickering's
sanity and whether the conduct charged rose to the level of an impeachable
offense.179 The Senate then convicted Judge Pickering on each count by a
vote of 19-7.180 After that, it voted 20-6 to remove Pickering from
office.18
176. IMPEAcHMENT MATERIALS, supra note 173, at 133-35.
177. See IMPEACHMENT PROCEDURE, supra note 3 1, at 397-99.
178. See id. at 403-04.
179. See id. at 409.
180. See id.
181. See id. Note, Professor Gerhardt has suggested that "the Senate has construed the
Constitution to make removal automatic upon a two-thirds vote on at least one article of impeachment."
GERHARDT, supra note 3, at 60. It is true that the Senate has removed every impeached official whom
it has convicted. Moreover, in the impeachment trial of Judge Ritter, the chair ruled that conviction
carries with it automatic removal. See infra text accompanying note 227. However, the Senate's action
here in voting separately on conviction and removal, as it also did in the impeachment trials of Judges
Humphreys and Archbald, see infra text accompanying notes 190 & 216, suggests that the two need not
be inexorably linked.
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SAMUEL CHASE
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
House Vote to Impeach: March 12, 1804182
Articles of Impeachment Adopted: December 4, 1804
Senate Action: March 1, 1805
Article 1: During the treason trial of John Fries, Chase "conduct[ed]
himself in a manner highly arbitrary, oppressive, and unjust"
by: (1) delivering a written legal opinion tending to prejudice
the jury against the defendant before defense counsel had
been heard; (2) prohibiting defense counsel from citing to
English authorities and United States statutes counsel
deemed illustrative; and (3) barring defense counsel from
addressing the jury on the law. This conduct deprived Fries
of his constitutional rights and disgraced the character of the
American bench.
Article 2: "Prompted by a similar spirit of persecution and injustice"
during the libel trial of James Callendar, and with the intent
to oppress and procure a conviction, Chase overruled an
objection to seating as a juror a person who had already
made up his mind that the defendant was guilty.
Article 3: During the Callendar trial, "with the intent to oppress and
procure a conviction," Chase excluded testimony of a
material defense witness on the pretense that the witness
could not prove the truth of the whole of the allegedly
libelous material, even though the charge embraced more
than one fact.
Article 4: Chase's conduct throughout the Callendar trial was marked
by "manifest injustice, partiality, and intemperance" by: (1)
requiring defense counsel to submit in writing to the court all
questions they planned to ask a witness; (2) refusing to
postpone the trial despite a proper request based on the
absence of a material defense witness; (3) being rude and
182. The vote to impeach Justice Chase apparently came less than one hour after the Senate
convicted and removed Judge Pickering. See Daniel H. Pollitt, Sex in the Oval Office and Cover-up
Under Oath: Impeachable Offense?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 259, 270 (1998). For a brief discussion of the
political nature of both impeachments, see id. at 268-71.
1999] 1569
HeinOnline  -- 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1569 1998-1999
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAWREVIEW
contemptuous of defense counsel and falsely insinuating that
they wished to excite public fears; (4) making repeated and
vexatious interruptions of defense counsel, inducing them to
abandon their cause and their client; and (5) expressing
undue concern, "unbecoming even a public prosecutor," for
the conviction of the accused.
Article 5: Chase illegally ordered the arrest of Callendar even though
he was not charged with a capital offense.
Article 6: Chase illegally tried Callendar during the same term in which
he was indicted.
Article 7: Disregarding the duties of his office, Chase "did descend
from the dignity of a judge and stoop to the level of
informer" by refusing to discharge a grand jury and advising
it of allegedly libelous publications with the intention of
procuring the prosecution of the printer, "thereby degrading
his high judicial functions and tending to impair the public
confidence" in the tribunals of justice.
Article 8: Disregarding the duties and dignity of his judicial character,
Chase delivered to a Maryland grand jury "an intemperate
and inflammatory political harangue, with the intent to excite
the fears and resentment" of the grand jury against the their
state government and constitution.
18 3
The Senate voted as follows: 184
Guilt Not Guilty
Article 1 16 18
Article 2 10 24
Article 3 18 16
Article 4 18 16
Article 5 0 34
Article 6 4 30
Article 7 10 24
Article 8 19 15
183. IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS, supra note 173, at 133-35.
184. See IMPEACHMENr PROCEDURE, supra note 31, at 472.
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Because the two-thirds majority required for conviction was lacking
on all counts, Justice Chase was acquitted.
JAMES H. PECK
Judge for the District of Missouri
House Vote to Impeach: April 24, 1830
Article of Impeachment Adopted: May 1, 1830
Senate Action: January 31, 1831
Article: In December 1825, Judge Peck issued a decree resolving a
dispute to certain territorial lands. While the matter was on
appeal to the Supreme Court, Judge Peck caused to be
published in a local newspaper the reasons for his decision.
Counsel for the appellants responded by getting another
newspaper to print a letter in which he identified the errors in
Judge Peck's opinion. In response, Judge Peck, "with
intention wrongfully and unjustly to oppress, imprison, and
otherwise injure" appellant's counsel, had counsel arrested,
held him in contempt, ordered him imprisoned for 24 hours,
and suspended him from practicing before the court for 18
months, all "to the great disparagement of public justice, the
abuse of judicial authority, and to the subversion of the
liberties of the people of the United States."' 85
The Senate vote was 21 for guilty, 22 for not guilty. Judge Peck was
therefore acquitted.186
WEST H. HUMPHREYS
Judge for the District of Tennessee
House Vote to Impeach: May 6, 1862
Articles of Impeachment Adopted: May 19, 1862
Senate Action: June 26, 1862
Article 1: On December 29, 1860, in Nashville, Tennessee, Humphreys
endeavored by public speech to incite revolt and rebellion
185. IMPEACHMENT MATERIAuLs, supra note 173, at 136-39.
186. See IMPEACHMENT PROCEDURE, supra note 31, at 506.
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against the Constitution and government of the United
States.
Article 2: In 1861, "with the intent to abuse the high trust reposed in
him as a judge," Humphreys openly and unlawfully
supported and advocated the secession of the State of
Tennessee.
Article 3: In 1861 and 1862, Humphreys organized an armed rebellion
against the United States and levied war against them.
Article 4: With Jefferson Davis and others, Humphreys conspired to
oppose by force the authority of the government of the
United States.
Article 5: With intent to prevent the due administration of the laws of
the United States, Humphreys neglected and refused to hold
court, as by law he was required to do.
Article 6: With intent to subvert the authority of the government of the
United States, Humphreys unlawfully acted as judge of an
illegally-constituted tribunal within Tennessee. In
connection with this, Humphreys: (1) caused the arrest of
one Perez Dickinson, and required him to swear allegiance to
the Confederacy, and when Perez refused, Humphreys
ordered Dickinson to leave the State; (2) ordered the
confiscation of property of citizens of the United States,
especially the property of one Andrew Johnson; and
(3) caused the arrest and imprisonment of citizens of the
United States because of their fidelity to their obligations as
citizens and their resistance to the Confederacy.
Article 7: Humphreys, as a judge of the Confederate States of America
and with the intent to injure one William G. Brownlow,
ordered his unlawful arrest and imprisonment.
187
Judge Humphreys offered no defense and made no appearance either
in person or through counsel.' 8 The Senate voted as follows:
189
Guilty Not Guilty
Article 1 39 0
187. See IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS, supra note 173, at 140-42.
188. See IMPEACHMENT PROCmURE, supra note 31, at 518.
189. See id. at 522.
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Article 2 36 1
Article 3 33 4
Article 4 28 10
Article 5 39 0
Article 6(1) 36 1
Article 6(2) 12 24
Article 6(3) 35 1
Article 7 35 1
Based on the guilty verdicts, the Senate then voted 38-0 to remove
Judge Humphreys from office and voted 36-0 to disqualify him from
holding in the future any office under the United States.
190
ANDREW JOHNSON
President of the United States
House Vote to Impeach: February 24, 1868
Articles of Impeachment Adopted: March 2, 1868
Senate Action: May 16, 1868
President Johnson was the only southern Senator not to leave
Congress when the South seceded. Later, as President, he obstructed many
of the Radical Reconstruction efforts of Congress. He removed every
military commander in the South who was committed to carrying out the
spirit of the Reconstruction Acts. He also denounced Black suffrage and
claimed that some of the Reconstruction Acts, passed over his veto, were
unconstitutional. Others, such as the Confiscation Act of 1862, he
effectively nullified by issuing a great number of pardons.
191
Beginning in late 1866, and in response to Johnson's opposition to
their political agenda, some members of the House tried to impeach the
President. They charged him with, among other things, corruption in the
use of his powers of appointment, pardon, and veto. 192 Some even
suggested that Johnson was guilty of complicity in the murder of President
190. See id. at 523-24. Senator Solomon Foot of Vermont, the president pro tempore of the
Senate who presided over the trial, ruled that removal and disqualification were separate issues, and
divided the vote on them. Cf. supra note 181.
191. See MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 41-43
(1973).
192. See IMPEACHMENT PROCEDURE, supra note 31, at 526-34.
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Lincoln.1 93 In March 1867, while the House Judiciary Committee was
investigating these charges, and apparently fearing that Johnson would
remove Secretary of War Stanton, the only Republican left in the cabinet
after the 1866 congressional elections, Congress passed the Tenure of
Office Act. This Act was designed to limit the President's power to
remove subordinate officials without the Senate's consent. It required that
all executive officials appointed with senatorial approval hold office until a
successor had been appointed and confirmed. Thus, until the Senate agreed
to a successor, senior executive officials could not be fired. A partial
exception was made for cabinet officers, who were to hold office only
during the term of the President who appointed them and for one month
thereafter.
In August. while Congress was out of session, Johnson suspended
Stanton. Although it was far from clear whether Stanton, who had been
appointed by President Lincoln, was truly covered by the Act, when
Congress reconvened in December, Johnson sent to the Senate his reasons
for suspending Stanton. He thus implicitly acknowledged that Stanton was
protected by the Act. The Senate declined to concur and Stanton returned
to his post. In December, the House of Representatives rejected by a vote
of 57-108 the long-pending effort to impeach President Johnson. 194
On January 30, 1868, Congressman Schofield of Pennsylvania took
the floor of the House. He proclaimed that area newspapers had reported
Supreme Court Justice Stephen J. Field to have openly announced that the
Tenure of Office Act was unconstitutional, and that the Court would be
sure to pronounce it so.195 In response, the House of Representatives began
an impeachment investigation against Justice Field.196 This investigation
dropped well into the background when, on February 21st, President
Johnson fired Secretary Stanton. Three days later, the House impeached
President Johnson by a vote of 128-47.197
Article 1: On February 21, 1868, Johnson unlawfully issued an order
for the removal of Edwin Stanton from his office as
Secretary of War.
Article 2: On February 21, 1868, Johnson unlawfully issued a letter to
Major General Lorenzo Thomas authorizing him to act as
193. See id. at 528.
194. See id. at 547.
195. See IRVING BRANT, IMPEACHMENT: TRIALS ANDERRORS 136-37 (1972).
196. See id. at 137.
197. See IMPEACHmENT PROCEDuRE, supra note 31, at 555.
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Secretary of War ad interim, despite the lack of a vacancy in
that office.
Article 3: On February 21, 1868, while the Senate was in session,
Johnson unlawfully appointed Lorenzo Thomas as Secretary
of War ad interim without the advice and consent of the
Senate.
Article 4: On February 21, 1868, Johnson illegally conspired with
General Thomas to hinder and prevent Secretary of War
Stanton from holding his office.
Article 5: On February 21, 1868, Johnson illegally conspired with
General Thomas to prevent and hinder the Tenure of Office
Act.
Article 6: On February 21, 1868, Johnson conspired with General
Thomas to take possession of United States Department of
War property, in violation of an 1861 Act to define and
punish certain conspiracies.
Article 7: On February 21, 1868, Johnson conspired with General
Thomas to take possession of United States Department of
War property, in violation of the Tenure of Office Act.
Article 8: On February 21, 1868, with the intent unlawfully to control
the disbursements of the Department of War, and in violation
of the Tenure of Office Act, Johnson delivered a letter to
General Thomas authorizing him to take charge of the
Department of War.
Article 9: On February 22, 1868, as Commander in Chief of the armed
forces, Johnson instructed Major General William Emory to
disregard and treat as unconstitutional the Tenure of Office
Act, particularly that portion that required all military orders
to be issued through the General of the Army, and to obey
such orders as Johnson may give directly.
Article 10: Johnson attempted "to bring into disgrace, ridicule, hatred,
contempt, and reproach the Congress of the United States"
by delivering loud, intemperate, inflammatory, and
scandalous harangues against the Congress.
Article 11: On August 18, 1866, Johnson delivered a public speech in
which he declared that the 39th Congress was not a lawful
Congress of the United States, but a Congress of only some
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of them, in an effort to deny the validity of congressional
legislation and the validity of proposed amendments to the
Constitution. 19
8
On May 16th, the Senate voted on Article 11. The vote was 35-19 for
guilty, one vote short of the two-thirds majority needed for conviction.199
The Senate then adjourned. On May 26th, the Senate voted on Articles 2
and 3. Again the vote was 35-19,200 whereupon the Senate voted to
adjourn the impeachment trial and the Chief Justice announced, without
objection, a judgment of acquittal. 201
One commentator has noted that "[i]f one argues that Johnson's
conviction would have resulted from votes motivated by political
considerations, one must concede that the same considerations secured his
acquittal. 20 2 This conclusion is based on evidence suggesting that at least
three of the seven Republicans who broke ranks and voted to acquit did so
in part for political reasons. Senators Fessenden and Grimes apparently
informed Johnson's counsel that they would feel freer to vote against
conviction if they were assured the President would stop interfering with
Reconstruction. They suggested that Johnson appoint General Schofield as
Secretary of War. Johnson did. Senator Ross suggested he would vote for
acquittal if the President accepted the new constitutions of Arkansas and
South Carolina. Johnson did that too.
In early 1875, Johnson was elected to the Senate by the Tennessee
legislature. He served there until his death in July, 1875.
WILLIAM W. BELKNAP
Former Secretary of War
House Vote to Impeach: March 2, 1876
Articles of Impeachment Adopted: April 3, 1876
Senate Action: August 1, 1876
198. See IMPEAcHMENT MATmIALs. supra note 173, at 154-60.
199. See IPEACHMENT PROCEDURE, supra note 31, at 602-03.
200. See id. at 605.
201. See id.
202. BENEDICT, supra note 191, at 126.
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On March 2, 1876, William Belknap resigned as Secretary of War.
Nevertheless, later that day the House proceeded to impeach him for his
alleged misconduct while in office.
20 3
Article 1: On October 8, 1870, Belknap appointed Caleb P. Marsh to
maintain a trading post at Fort Sill. On the same day, Marsh
contracted with John S. Evans for Evans to fill the
commission as post trader at Fort Sill in exchange for a
yearly payment to Marsh of $12,000. On October 10th, at
the request of Marsh, Belknap appointed Evans to maintain
the trading establishment at Fort Sill. On November 2, 1870,
and on four more occasions over the next year, Belknap
unlawfully received $1,500 payments from Marsh in
consideration of allowing Evans to maintain a trading
establishment at Fort Sill.
Article 2: Belknap, after "willfully, corruptly, and unlawfully" taking
$1,500 from Marsh to permit Evans to maintain a trading
post at Fort Sill, corruptly allowed Evans to maintain that
trading post.
Article 3: From October 1870 to December 1875, Belknap received
half of every payment Evans made to Marsh, during which
period Belknap, "basely prostituting his high office to his
lust for private gain" continued to allow Evans to serve as
post trader, all to the great injury of the officers and soldiers
of the Army of the United States.
Article 4: [This article details, in 17 separate specifications, the 17
separate payments, ranging from $750 to $1,700, Belknap
received from Marsh in consideration of allowing Evans to
remain post trader.]
Article 5: Belknap permitted Evans to remain post trader until March 2,
1876, despite knowing that Evans had contracted to pay
Marsh for his influence in securing the appointment; and
that, in order to make sure that the payments to Marsh would
continue, Belknap received or caused his wife to receive
large sums of money. 2 4
On April 17th, former Secretary Belknap appeared in person and
urged the Senate to take no further cognizance of the articles of
203. See IMPEACHMENT PROCEDURE, supra note 31, at 608-09.
204. See ItPEACHi-ENT MATERIALS, supra note 173, at 143-48.
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impeachment on the grounds that as a private citizen he was not subject to
impeachment.20 5 However, on May 29th, by a vote of 37-29, the Senate
resolved that Belknap was amenable to trial by impeachment,
notwithstanding his resignation before the House impeached him.2 6 It
then gave him ten days to file a plea. Belknap refused to enter a plea, and
instead continued to challenge the Senate's jurisdiction. 207 The Senate
proceeded with the trial as if Belknap had pleaded not guilty, and
Belknap's counsel cross-examined the House manager's witnesses and then




Article 1 35 25
Article 2 36 25
Article 3 36 25
Article 4 36 25
Article 5 37 25
As a result, Mr. Belknap was acquitted. Twenty-two of the Senators
who voted to acquit (as well as two who voted to convict and one who did
not vote) believed the Senate lacked jurisdiction.210
CHARLES H. SWAYNE
Judge for the Northern District of Florida
House Vote to Impeach: December 13, 1904
Articles of Impeachment Adopted: January 18, 1905
Senate Action: February 27, 1905
Article 1: On April 20, 1897, knowing that a far less sum was due, and
for the purpose of obtaining payment, Swayne made a false
claim in the amount of $230 against the United States for
205. See IMPEACHMENT PROCmURE, supra note 31 at 624-25.
206. See id. at 639.
207. See id. at 641-42.
208. See id. at 644-46.
209. See id. at 651.
210. See id.
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travel expenses relating to holding court in Waco, Texas. In
doing so, he signed a false certificate.
Article 2: Swayne, knowing the rules on reimbursement for expenses,
falsely certified that his expenses in travelling to, holding
court in, and returning from Tyler, Texas, in December 1900
were $10 per day for 31 days, for which he received $310,
when in fact his actual expenses were less.
Article 3: Swayne, knowing the rules on reimbursement for expenses,
falsely certified that his expenses in travelling to, holding
court in, and returning from Tyler, Texas, in January 1903
were $10 per day for 41 days, for which he received $410,
when in fact his actual expenses were less.
Article 4: In 1893, for the purpose of transporting himself, his family,
and his friends from Delaware to Florida, Swayne unlawfully
appropriated to his own use a railroad car owned by a
railroad company that was under receivership in his court. In
addition, and without paying therefor, Swayne was supplied
by the receiver with provisions which he and his friends
consumed, as well as the services of a conductor. Then, in
his capacity as judge, Swayne allowed the receiver to claim
these expenses as part of the necessary costs of operating the
railroad company.
Article 5: In 1893, for the purpose of transporting himself, his family,
and his friends from Florida to California, Swayne
unlawfully appropriated to his own use a railroad car owned
by a railroad company which was under receivership in his
court. In addition, and without paying therefor, Swayne was
supplied by the receiver with provisions which he and his
friends consumed, as well as the services of a conductor.
Then, in his capacity as judge, Swayne allowed the receiver
to claim these expenses as part of the necessary costs of
operating the railroad company.
Article 6: When Congress altered the boundaries of the northern
district of Florida in 1894 in a way that removed Swayne's
residence from the district, Swayne did not acquire a new
residence within the district for more than six years, in
violation of a law requiring judges to reside in the district in
which they sit.
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Article 7: "[Totally disregarding his duty" to reside within the newly
defined district, Swayne did not do so for a period of about
nine years.
Article 8: On November 12, 1901, Swayne "did maliciously and
unlawfully" hold an attorney named E.T. Davis in contempt
of court, for which Swayne fined him $100 and imprisoned
him for ten days.
Article 9: On November 12, 1901, Swayne "did knowingly and
unlawfully" hold an attorney named E.T. Davis in contempt
of court, for which Swayne fined him $100 and imprisoned
him for ten days.
Article 10: On November 12, 1901, Swayne "did maliciously and
unlawfully" hold an attorney named Simeon Belden in
contempt of court, for which Swayne fined him $100 and
imprisoned him for ten days.
Article 11: On November 12, 1901, Swayne "did knowingly and
unlawfully" hold an attorney named Simeon Belden in
contempt of court, for which Swayne fined him $100 and
imprisoned him for ten days.
Article 12: On December 9, 1902, Swayne "did unlawfully and
knowingly" hold W.C. O'Neal in contempt of court, for
which Swayne imprisoned him for 60 days.21'
Judge Swayne was acquitted after the Senate voted as follows:212
Guilty Not Guilty
Article 1 33 49
Article 2 32 50
Article 3 32 50
Article 4 13 69
Article 5 13 69
Article 6 31 51
Article 7 19 63
Article 8 31 51
Article 9 31 51
Article 10 31 51
211. IMPEACHMENTMATERILALS, supra note 173, at 149-53.
212. See IMPEACHMENT PROCEDURE, supra note 31, at 684.
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Article 11 31 51
Article 12 35 47
ROBERT W. ARCHBALD
Judge for the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Articles of Impeachment Adopted: July 11, 1912213
Senate Action: January 13, 1913
Article 1: On March 31, 1911, while assigned to the United States
Commerce Court, Archbald induced the Erie Railroad
Company, which was a litigant in several cases before the
Commerce Court, to sell him and a partner certain property
owned by a subsidiary corporation. In doing this, Archbald
"willfully, unlawfully, and corruptly took advantage of his
official position of a judge" in order to profit for himself.
Article 2: In August 1911, Archbald willfully, unlawfully, and
corruptly used his influence as a judge of the Commerce
Court to induce parties in litigation pending before the court
and before the Interstate Commerce Commission to settle
their dispute by having one party sell two-thirds of its stock
to another party.
Article 3: In October 1911, Archbald unlawfully and corruptly used his
official position and influence as a judge of the Commerce
Court to cause a litigant before that court to lease him a culm
dump containing large coal deposits.
Article 4: In late 1911 and early 1912, Archbald communicated
secretly with the attorney for one party in a case before the
Commerce Court and advised the attorney to see one of the
witnesses and get an explanation and interpretation of the
testimony given by the witness. He then secretly informed
the attorney of the court's discovery of evidence contrary to
the statements of the attorney and advised the attorney to
submit additional arguments. Archbald did this all without
the knowledge or consent of the Commerce Court.
213. Beginning with the impeachment of Judge Archbald, the House voted on impeachment only
after specific articles of impeachment were presented to it, usually by the Judiciary Committee.
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Article 5: In 1904, Archbald wrongfully attempted to use his influence
to assist Frederick Warmke in obtaining a lease of a culm
dump owned by Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., a
company which also owns a railroad engaged in interstate
commerce. After Archbald's efforts proved unsuccessful, he
accepted a promissory note for $500 from Warnke for
making the attempt and for other favors.
Article 6: In 1911, Archbald unlawfully, improperly, and corruptly
attempted to use his influence as a judge to induce the
officers of Lehigh Valley Coal Co. to purchase an interest in
an 800-acre tract of coal land.
Article 7: In 1908, Archbald wrongfully and corruptly agreed to
purchase the stock in a gold-mining scheme in Honduras
with W.W. Rissinger, who owned the Old Plymouth Coal
Co., a plaintiff in several cases pending before Archbald.
Archbald later ruled for the Old Plymouth on several legal
issues, resulting in settlements by which Old Plymouth
recovered approximately $28,000.
Article 8: In 1909, Archbald drew a promissory note for $500 in his
favor and had it signed by John Henry Jones. At that time,
Christopher and William Boland owned a coal company
engaged in litigation involving a large sum of money and
over which Archbald was presiding. Archbald agreed that
the note, bearing his name and indorsement, should be
presented to the Bolands in an effort to get them to discount
it. This was done with the intent that Archbald's name on
the note would coerce or induce them to do so.
Article 9: In 1909 Archbald drew another promissory note in his favor
for $500 and had it signed by John Henry Jones. Knowing
that his own endorsement was not sufficient to secure money
in normal commercial channels, Archbald wrongfully
permitted the indorsed note to be presented for discount at
the office of C.H. Von Storch, in whose favor Archbald had
recently ruled in a lawsuit. Von Storch did discount the note.
The note has never been paid.
Article 10: On May 1, 1910, Archbald received a large sum of money
from Henry W. Cannon for the purpose of defraying the cost
of a pleasure trip to Europe. At that time, Cannon was a
stockholder and officer of various interstate railway
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companies that in due course were likely to be interested in
litigation pending in the Commerce Court and presided over
by Archbald. Accepting this money was improper and
brought Archbald's office into disrepute.
Article 11: In May 1910, Archbald received more than $500 from
attorneys who practiced before him, the money having been
solicited by court officers appointed by Archbald.
Article 12: On April 9, 1901, Archbald appointed J.B. Woodward, an
attorney for Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., as jury
commissioner for his district court. While serving as jury
commissioner, Woodward continued to act as attorney for
the railroad, which Archbald well knew.
Article 13: During his time as a district judge and as a judge assigned to
the Commerce Court, Archbald wrongfully sought to obtain
credit from and through persons who were interested in
litigation over which he presided. He speculated for profit in
the purchase and sale of various coal properties, and
unlawfully used his position as judge to influence officers of
various railroad companies to enter into contracts in which
he had a financial interest, which such companies had
litigation pending in his court.
2 14
The Senate voted as follows:2
15
Guilty Not Guilty
Article 1 68 5
Article 2 46 25
Article 3 60 11
Article 4 52 20
Article 5 66 6
Article 6 24 45
Article 7 29 36
Article 8 22 42
Article 9 23 39
Article 10 1 65
Article 11 11 51
214. See IMPEACHMENT MATERIALS, supra note 173, at 177-83.
215. See IMPEACIh ENT PROCEDURE, supra note 31, at 817.
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Article 12 19 46
Article 13 42 20
After the guilty verdict was announced, the Senate voted to remove
Judge Archbald from office. Then, by a vote of 39-35, it disqualified him
from holding any office under the United States in the future.216
GEORGE ENGLISH
Judge for the Eastern District of Illinois
Articles of Impeachment Adopted: April 1, 1926
Senate Action: December 13, 1926
Article 1: English abused his office through tyranny and oppression,
thereby bringing the administration of justice in his court
into disrepute, by (1) disbarring Thomas Webb and later
Charles A. Karch without proferring charges against either,
without prior notice to either, and without permitting either
to be heard in his own defense; (2) unlawfully and
deceitfully summoning several state and local officials to
appear before him in an imaginary case, placing them in a
jury box, and then in a loud, angry voice and using profane
and indecent language, denouncing them without naming any
act of misconduct and threatening to remove them from their
offices; (3) intending to coerce the minds of certain jurymen
by telling them that he would send them to jail if they did not
convict a defendant whom the judge said was guilty; (4)
unlawfully summoning an editor of the East St. Louis
Journal and a reporter for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch and in
angry and abusive language threatening them with
imprisonment if they published truthful facts relating to the
disbarment of Karch; and (5) unlawfully summoning the
publisher of the Carbondale Free Press and threatening to
imprison him for printing an editorial and some handbills.
Article 2: English engaged in a course of unlawful and improper
conduct, "filled with partiality and favoritism," in connection
216. See id. With regard to the Senate's separately voting on guilt and removal, compare supra
note 181.
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with bankruptcy cases within the district. He did this by,
among other things: (1) appointing Charles B. Thomas as the
referee for all such cases; (2) unlawfully changing the rules
of bankruptcy for the district to allow Thomas both to
appoint friends and relatives as receivers and to charge the
cost of expensive office space to the United States and the
estates in bankruptcy; and (3) allowing Thomas to hire
English's son at a large compensation to be paid out of funds
of the estates in bankruptcy.
Article 3: English corruptly extended partiality and favoritism,
bringing the administration of justice into disrepute, by
refusing to appoint the temporary receivers suggested by
counsel for the parties in interest in a major case unless
Charles Thomas was appointed attorney for such receivers.
When they agreed, he retroactively increased the salary for
Thomas, producing a total charge of $43,350, even though
Thomas' services were not necessary. English did similar
things in other cases. In a criminal case, English sentenced
the convicted defendant to four months and a $500 fine.
When the defendant's counsel withdrew and was replaced by
Thomas, English vacated the sentence of imprisonment. For
this, the defendant paid Thomas $2,500. English acted on
the matter without the presence of Thomas in the court and
without investigation, in order to show favoritism to Thomas,
to whom English was under financial obligation. English
then received $1,435 from Thomas in return for the
favoritism extended.
Article 4: In conjunction with Thomas, English corruptly and
improperly deposited, transferred, and used bankruptcy funds
for the pecuniary benefit of himself and Thomas.
Article 5: English repeatedly treated members of the bar in a course,
indecent, arbitrary, and tyrannical manner, so as to hinder
them in their duties and deprive their clients of the benefits
of counsel. He wickedly and illegally refused to allow
parties the benefit of trial by jury. He conducted himself in
making decisions and issuing orders so as to inspire the
widespread belief that matters in his court were not decided
on their merits, but with partiality and favoritism.217
217. See IMNPEACiMENT MATEIALS, supra note 173, at 164-73.
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Judge English resigned his office on November 4, 1926.211 On
December 11th, the House managers of the impeachment reported that
Judge English's resignation "in no way affects the right of the Senate" to
hear and determine the impeachment charges. Nevertheless, they
recommended that the impeachment proceedings against him be
discontinued.219 The House then passed a resolution indicating its desire
not to urge the articles of impeachment before the Senate.2 ° On December
13th, the Senate concurred by a vote of 70-9.221
HAROLD LOUDERBACK
Judge for the Northern District of California
Articles of Impeachment Adopted: February 24, 1933;
Amended: April 17, 1936
Senate Action: May 24, 1933
Article 1: Louderback abused the power of his office through tyranny,
oppression, favoritism, and conspiracy, and brought the
administration of justice within the district into disrepute. In
particular, on March 11, 1930, he discharged Addison G.
Strong as receiver in a case after he attempted to coerce
Strong to hire Douglas Short as attorney for the receiver by
promising to allow large fees and threatening to reduce fees
if Short were not appointed. He then appointed Short, who
had been suggested by Sam Leake, to whom Louderback was
under personal obligation. Leake had previously conspired
with Louderback to rent lodgings for Louderback in San
Francisco under Leake's name, so that Louderback could
reside in San Francisco while maintaining a fictitious
residence in Contra Costa County, so that a lawsuit
Louderback expected to be filed against him could be
removed to Contra Costa County. Short did receive
exorbitant fees for his services as attorney for the receiver,
and Leake received a kickback from Short.
218. See IMPEACHMENT PROCEDURE,supra note 31, at 890.
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Article 2: Louderback, filled with partiality and favoritism, improperly
granted excessive and exorbitant allowances to the receiver
and attorney he had appointed in a case over which he had
improperly acquired jurisdiction. When his orders in the
case were reversed on appeal, and Louderback was directed
to order the receiver to turn the property over to the state
insurance commissioner, Louderback improperly and
illegally conditioned that order on the commissioner's
agreement not to appeal the award of fees Louderback had
granted to the receiver and attorney. This allowed
Louderback to favor and enrich his friends at the expense of
the litigants and parties in interest in the case.
Article 3: Louderback misbehaved in office, resulting in expense,
annoyance, and hindrance to the litigants, by appointing Guy
H. Gilbert as receiver in a case, knowing that Gilbert was
incompetent and unqualified for that position. He then
refused the litigants a hearing on the appointment and caused
them to be misinformed of his actions.
Article 4: For the sole purpose of enriching his friends, Louderback
appointed a receiver on an improper application in a case
involving Prudential Holding Co. Louderback then refused
to give proper consideration to Prudential's petition to
remove the receiver. When Prudential became the subject of
a bankruptcy case, Louderback improperly and illegally took
jurisdiction over the case, and appointed the receiver as
receiver in bankruptcy, causing Prudential unnecessary
expense and depriving it of the right to fair and impartial
consideration of its rights.
Article 5: During his tenure as judge and in the manner in which he
issued orders, appointed receivers, and appointed attorneys
for receivers, Louderback displayed "a high degree of
indifference to the litigants" and inspired the widespread
belief that matters in his court were not decided on their
merits, but with partiality and favoritism, all of which is
prejudicial to the dignity of the judiciary.222
In response to a motion from Judge Louderback's counsel for a more
definite statement of Article 5B the House later amended it to make it more
222. IhIPEACHMENTMATERLALS, supra note 173, at 184-87.
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detailed.22 3  The Senate acquitted Judge Louderback by voting as
follows:224
Guilty Not Guilty
Article 1 34 42
Article 2 23 47
Article 3 11 63
Article 4 30 47
Article 5 45 34
HALSTEAD L. RrrER
Judge for the Southern District of Florida
Articles of Impeachment Adopted: March 2, 1936
Amended: March 30, 1936
Senate Action: April 17, 1936
Article 1: In July 1930, Ritter awarded his former law partner an
advance of $2,500 for his services in a receivership
proceeding. Ritter, aware of the appearance of impropriety,
then asked another judge in the district to fix the final fee
allowance. The other judge did so, setting the fee at $15,000.
Nevertheless, Ritter then allowed an additional $75,000.
When the amount was paid, the former partner in turn paid
Ritter $4,500 in cash, which Ritter corruptly and unlawfully
accepted for his own use and benefit.
Article 2: In 1929, Ritter conspired with his former law partner and
others to place a hotel into receivership in proceeding before
Ritter. The former partner then filed the action without
authorization from and contrary to the instructions of the
parties in interest. When the matter came before Ritter, he
refused the parties' request to dismiss -the action and
appointed one of the other conspirators receiver. Then
follow the facts alleged in Article 1. Ritter willfully failed to
perform his duty to conserve the assets of the company in
223. See IMPEACHMENT PROCEDURE, supra note 31, at 835-39.
224. See id. at 850.
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receivership. Instead, he permitted their waste and
dissipation, and personally profited thereby.
Article 3: Ritter violated the Judicial Code of the United States by
continuing to work on a case after he became a judge, and he
solicited and accepted additional $2,000 in fees for such
work.
Article 4: Ritter violated the Judicial Code of the United States by
working on another case after he became a judge, for which
he received $7,500.
Article 5: Ritter violated federal law by willfully attempting to evade
federal tax on income earned in 1929. Specifically, he
received $12,000 in unreported income, $9,500 of which
relates to matters described in Articles 3 and 4.
Article 6: Ritter violated federal law by willfully attempting to evade
federal tax on income earned in 1930. Specifically, he
received $5,300 in unreported income, $2,000 of which
relates to matters described in Article 1.
Article 7: The reasonable and probable consequences of Ritter's
actions were "to bring his court into scandal and disrepute,"
to the prejudice of the court and public confidence in the
administration of justice therein. Specifically, in addition to
the conduct in Articles 1 through 6, when one of his
decisions came under public criticism, Ritter agreed to recuse
himself from the case if the city commissioners of Miami
passed a resolution expressing confidence in his integrity.
Ritter thereby bartered his judicial authority for a vote of
confidence. 22
5
The Senate voted on the articles of impeachment as follows:
226
Guilty Not Guilty
Article 1 55 29
Article 2 52 32
Article 3 44 39
Article 4 36 48
Article 5 36 48
225. IMPEACIMENT MATERUS, supra note 173, at 188-202.
226. See 80 CONG. REC. 5602-06 (1936).
1999] 1589
HeinOnline  -- 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1589 1998-1999
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA _AWREVIEW
Article 6 46 37
Article 7 56 28
As a result, Judge Ritter was acquitted on the first six articles, each of
which charged specific wrongdoing, but was convicted on the final, general
article charging Ritter with bringing his court into scandal and disrepute.
The chair ruled that conviction carries with it removal from office, without
a further vote being necessary.2 27 The Senate then voted 76-0 not to
disqualify Ritter from holding future office.228
HARRY CLAIBORNE
Judge for the District of Nevada
Articles of Impeachment Adopted: July 22, 1986
Senate Action: October 9, 1986
Article 1: In June 1980, and in violation of federal law, Claiborne
willfully and knowingly filed a federal income tax return for
the year 1979 that failed to report a substantial amount of
income.
Article 2: In June 1981, and in violation of federal law, Claiborne
willfully and knowingly filed a federal income tax return for
the year 1980 that failed to report a substantial amount of
income.
Article 3: On August 10, 1984, Claiborne was found guilty of making
and subscribing a false income tax return for the calendar
years 1979 and 1980.
Article 4: By willfully and knowingly falsifying his income on his
federal tax returns for 1979 and 1980, Claiborne "betrayed
the trust of the people of the United States and reduced
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,
thereby bringing disrepute on the federal courts and the
administration of justice by the courts."229
227. See id. at 5607. Cf supra note 181.
228. See id.
229. 132 CONG. REc. 17295-305 (1986).
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After a trial committee received the evidence, the entire Senate voted
on the articles of impeachment as follows:
230
Guilty Not Guilty Present
Article 1 87 10 1
Article 2 90 7 1
Article 3 46 17 35
Article 4 89 8 1
Judge Claiborne was therefore convicted on counts 1, 2 and 4 but
acquitted on count 3.231
ALCEE L. HASTINGS
Judge for the Southern District of Florida
Articles of Impeachment Adopted: August 3, 1988
Senate Action: October 20, 1989
Article 1: In 1981, Hastings and William Borders, an attorney, engaged
in a corrupt conspiracy to obtain $150,000 from defendants
in United States v. Romano,232 a case tried before Judge
Hastings, in return for the imposition of sentences which
would not require incarceration.
Article 2: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case
and under oath, Hastings knowingly and falsely stated that he
and Borders never made any agreement to solicit a bribe
from defendants in the Romano case.
Article 3: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case
and under oath, Hastings knowingly and falsely stated that he
230. See 132 CONG. REc. 29870-72 (1986).
231. Although more than two-thirds of those voting voted to convict, fewer than two-thirds of
those present voted to convict. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 3. This issue apparently also arose in the
impeachment trial of Judge Ritter. After the Senate voted 56-28 on the last Article of Impeachment, the
chair pronounced Ritter guilty. Senator Austin made a point of order suggesting, among other things,
that the required two-thirds majority was lacking because two-thirds of those present had not voted to
convict. See 80 CONG. REC. 5606 (1986). The point of order was overruled. See id. In doing so, the
president pro tempore commented briefly on Senator Austin's other arguments, but made no reference
to the requirement of a two-thirds majority of those present.
232. 523 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D. Fla. 1981)
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and Borders never agreed to modify the sentences of
defendants in the Romano case in return for a bribe from
those defendants.
Article 4: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case
and under oath, Hastings knowingly and falsely stated that he
and Borders never agreed that, in return for a bribe, Hastings
would modify an order he previously issued that property of
the Romano defendants be forfeited.
Article 5: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case
and under oath, Hastings knowingly and falsely stated that
his appearance at the Fontainebleau Hotel on September 16,
1981, was not part of a plan to demonstrate his participation
in a bribery scheme and that he had not expected to meet
Borders there.
Article 6: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case
and under oath, Hastings knowingly and falsely stated that he
did not expect Borders to appear at his room at the Sheraton
Hotel on September 12, 1981.
Article 7: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case
and under oath, Hastings knowingly and falsely stated that
his motive for instructing his law clerk to prepare a new
forfeiture order in the Romano case was based on his concern
that the order be revised before the law clerk's scheduled
departure, when in fact the instruction was in furtherance of a
bribery scheme.
Article 8: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case
and under oath, Hastings knowingly and falsely stated that
his October 5, 1981, telephone conversation with Borders
was about writing letters to solicit assistance for Hemphill
Pride, when in fact it was a coded conversation in
furtherance of a conspiracy with Borders to solicit a bribe
from defendants in the Romano case.
Article 9: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case
and under oath, Hastings knowingly and falsely stated that
three documents that purported to be drafts of letters to assist
Hemphill Pride had been written by Hastings on October 5,
1981, and were the letters referred to by Hastings in his
October 5th telephone conversation with Borders.
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Article 10: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case
and under oath, Hastings knowingly and falsely stated that
on May 5, 1981, he talked to Hemphill Pride by placing a
telephone call to 803-758-8825.
Article 11: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a crinmal case
and under oath, Hastings knowingly and falsely stated that
on August 2, 1981, he talked to Hemphill Pride by placing a
telephone call to 803-782-9387.
Article 12: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case
and under oath, Hastings knowingly and falsely stated that
on September 2, 1981, he talked to Hemphill Pride by
placing a telephone call to 803-758-8825.
Article 13: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case
and under oath, Hastings knowingly and falsely stated that
803-777-7716 was a telephone number through which
Hemphill Pride could be contacted in July 1981.
Article 14: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case
and under oath, Hastings knowingly and falsely stated that
on October 9, 1981, he called his mother and Patricia
Williams from his hotel room at the L'Enfant Plaza Hotel.
Article 15: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case
and under oath, Hastings knowingly made a false statement
concerning his motives for taking a plane on October 9,
1981, from Baltimore-Washington International Airport
rather than from Washington National Airport.
Article 16: On September 6, 1985, Hastings revealed highly confidential
information that he learned as the judge supervising a
wiretap. As a result of this improper disclosure, certain
investigations then being conducted by law enforcement
agents of the United States were thwarted and ultimately
terminated.
Article 17: Hastings, through a corrupt relationship with Borders, giving
false testimony under oath, fabricating false documents, and
improperly disclosing confidential information acquired by
him as the supervisory judge of a wiretap, undermined
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary
and betrayed the trust of the people of the United States,
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thereby bringing disrepute on the Federal courts and the
administration of justice by the Federal courts.233
Prior to Senate action, Hastings had been acquitted in a criminal trial
for bribery and conspiracy, but his alleged co-conspirator, Borders, had
been convicted in a separate trial. During the impeachment trial, a
committee of the Senate received the evidence. Prior to voting on the
articles of impeachment, and with the consent of both the House managers
and counsel for Judge Hastings, the entire Senate decided that if it acquitted
on Article 1, no vote should be taken on Articles 2-5, 7 or 8.234 Instead, a
judgment of acquittal on those charges should be automatically entered.
The Senate then began to vote. After voting on the first six articles, the
Senate decided it would be unnecessary to vote on Articles 10 through 15.




































Judge Hastings was therefore deemed removed from office. In 1992,
Hastings was elected to and became a member of the House of
Representatives. He is currently in his fourth term.
233. See 134 CONG. REC. 20208-09 & 20221 (1988).
234. See 135 CONG. REC. 25329 (1989).
235. See 135 CONG. REC. 25330-35 (1989).
1594 [Vol. 72:1517
HeinOnline  -- 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1594 1998-1999
LIMITS ON PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT
WALTER L. NIXON
Judge for the Southern District of Mississippi
Articles of Impeachment Adopted: May 10, 1989
Senate Action: November 3, 1989
Article 1: On July 18, 1984, Nixon testified before a federal grand jury
investigating his business relationship with Wiley Fairchild
and the handling of the criminal prosecution of Fairchild's
son for drug smuggling. In doing so, he falsely denied ever
having discussed the Fairchild case with District Attorney
Paul Holmes.
Article 2: On July 18, 1984, Nixon testified before a federal grand jury
investigating his business relationship with Wiley Fairchild
and the handling of the criminal prosecution of Fairchild's
son for drug smuggling. In doing so, he falsely asserted that
he had nothing whatsoever to do with the Fairchild case and
had never influenced anybody with respect to it.
Article 3: Nixon "has raised substantial doubt as to his judicial
integrity, undermined confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, betrayed the trust of the people
of the United States, disobeyed the laws of the United States
and brought disrepute on the Federal courts and the
administration of justice by the Federal courts." He did this,
after entering into an investment with Wiley Fairchild, by
concealing from federal investigators and from a grand jury
conversations Nixon had with Fairchild, the District
Attorney, and others about the prosecution of Fairchild's
son.
2 36
In 1986, Nixon was convicted on federal criminal charges for the
conduct described in Articles 1 and 2. At the time of his impeachment
trial, he had exhausted his appeals and was serving a five-year sentence.
The Senate appointed a committee to receive the evidence at trial. The
whole Senate then voted on the articles of impeachment as follows:
37
236. See 135 CONG. REC. 8814-24 (1989).
237. See 135 CONG. REc. 27102-04 (1989).
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Guilty Not Guilty
Article 1 89 8
Article 2 78 19
Article 3 57 40
As a result of the conviction on Articles 1 and 2, Nixon was removed
from office, without a separate vote.
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
President of the United States
Articles of Impeachment Adopted: December 19, 1998
Senate Action: February 12, 1999
Article 1: On August 17, 1998, President Clinton gave perjurious, false
and misleading testimony to a grand jury concerning one or
more of the following: (1) the nature and details of his
relationship with a subordinate Government employee; (2)
prior perjurious testimony he gave in a federal civil rights
action brought against him; (3) prior false and misleading
statements he allowed his attorney to make to the judge in
that civil rights action; and (4) his corrupt efforts to influence
the testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of
evidence in that civil rights action.238
Article 2: Clinton obstructed the administration of justice, personally
and through subordinates, by engaging in a course of conduct
designed to conceal the existence of evidence and testimony
related to a civil rights action brought against him. Clinton
did this by: (1) On or about December 17, 1997, corruptly
encouraging a witness in a federal civil rights action brought
against him to execute a sworn affidavit that he knew to be
perjurious; (2) on or about December 17, 1997, corruptly
encouraging a witness in a civil rights action brought against
him to give perjurious testimony if and when called to testify
in that proceeding; (3) on or about December 28, 1997,
238. It is interesting to compare the specificity of this charge to the articles of impeachment
against Judges Hastings and Nixon, both of whom were also charged with pejury. In both of the prior
cases, the articles of impeachment identified very specific pejuious statements that the judges
allegedly made, whereas the charge against President Clinton was entirely general.
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corruptly engaging in a scheme to conceal evidence that had
been subpoenaed in the civil rights action brought against
him; (4) from December 7, 1997, through January 14, 1998,
endeavoring to secure a job for a witness in the civil rights
action brought against him in order to corruptly prevent the
truthful testimony of that witness in that proceeding; (5) on
or about January 17, 1998, at his deposition in the civil rights
action, corruptly allowing his attorney to make false and
misleading statements to the judge, in order to prevent
questioning deemed relevant by the judge; (6) on or about
January 18 and 20-21, 1998, relating a false account of
events relevant to the civil rights action to a potential
witness, in order to corruptly influence the testimony of that
witness; and (7) on or about January 21, 23 and 26, 1998,
making false statements to potential witnesses in a grand jury
proceeding in order to corruptly influence the testimony of
those witnesses.239
Both Articles of Impeachment sought not only Clinton's removal from
office, but also his disqualification from holding any federal office in the
future. After trial, the Senate voted as follows:
Guilty Not Guilty
Article 1 45 55
Article 2 50 50
As a result, President Clinton was acquitted.
239. See 144 CONG. REC. HI 1774-75 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1998). Article 1 was adopted by a vote
of 228-206. Article 3 was adopted by a vote of 221-212. See 144 CONG. REC. H12040-42 (daily ed.
Dec. 19, 1998). The House rejected two other proposed Articles of Impeachment. One of these,
rejected by a vote of 205-229, concerned giving false responses to interrogatories and false deposition
testimony in the Paula Jones suit. The other, rejected by a vote of 148-285, concerned the President's
refusal to respond to some requests for admission and his providing false responses to other requests for
admission presented to him by the House Judiciary Committee in connection with the impeachment
investigation. See id.
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